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CHECK FRAUD AND THE COMMON LAW: 
AT THE INTERSECTION OF NEGLIGENCE 
AND THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
Abstract: Common law negligence claims persist in check fraud cases de-
spite the Uniform Commercial Code’s loss allocation provisions in Arti-
cles 3 and 4. Absent an explicit preemption provision, courts disagree as 
to whether, when, and to what extent the Code preempts these common 
law claims. As a result, the courts’ varying analytical approaches to com-
mon law negligence claims often create seemingly conflicting results. This 
Note reviews the current loss allocation rules in check fraud scenarios 
and examines recent preemption case law. It argues in favor of the com-
prehensive rights and remedies analysis used by the majority of courts to 
determine the circumstances under which common law negligence 
claims should be allowed under the Code. It also makes recommenda-
tions for future Code revisions based on the recent case law. Finally, this 
Note suggests that the loss allocation scheme as presently constituted pro-
vides a latent benefit to the payment system by encouraging customers to 
move toward electronic payment. 
Introduction 
 Delighted by the sudden success of his business but unable to keep 
up with operations himself, a small business owner hires an accountant 
to manage the company’s finances.1 The owner’s trust is misplaced, and 
the accountant embezzles hundreds of thousands of dollars from the 
business over the next several years.2 The owner neither reviews 
monthly bank statements nor audits the books, but hundreds of checks 
issued to the business were indorsed over to the accountant and depos-
ited in his personal bank account without a second look from his bank.3 
                                                                                                                      
1 For actual occurrences of this scenario and its potential repercussions, see Lee New-
man, M.D., Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, 87 Cal. App. 4th 73, 75–76 (Ct. App. 2001) (discuss-
ing liability for losses where an assistant bookkeeper and office manager forged company 
indorsements on insurance payments and cashed or signed the checks over to themselves); 
Peters Family Farm v. The Sav. Bank, No. 10CA2, 2011 WL 497476, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Jan. 28, 2011) (discussing liability for losses where an accountant cashed checks signed by 
a company president for fictitious tax liability). 
2 See Lee Newman, 87 Cal. App. 4th at 76; Peters Family Farm, 2011 WL 497467, at *1. 
3 See Lee Newman, 87 Cal. App. 4th at 76; Peters Family Farm, 2011 WL 497467, at *1. 
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 A decedent’s heirs hire an attorney to administer their loved one’s 
estate.4 When the heirs call the bank to inquire about missing monthly 
statements, they are dismayed to learn that the funds are now with the 
estate administrator somewhere in the South Pacific.5 Although the 
administrator was not authorized to initiate transactions on the estate’s 
account without a cosigner, the bank allowed him to do so several 
times.6 
 An elderly gentleman receives a bank check in the mail along with 
a letter from an African prince and humanitarian asking for his help.7 
Feeling skeptical, the gentleman asks a bank manager how long he 
should wait to ensure that the check will be honored.8 The bank man-
ager informs him that the bank check is “as good as cash” and can be 
moved at any time without risk.9 Based on this information, the cus-
tomer sends a wire transfer out of the country per his agreement with 
the African prince.10 Unfortunately, the check deposited to cover the 
wire is returned the same day by the payor bank because it was fraudu-
lent.11 
 These and other similar scenarios play out each day in our pay-
ment system.12 Not surprisingly, check fraud scenarios create significant 
litigation involving loss allocation.13 Parties often disagree as to which 
                                                                                                                      
 
4 For an actual occurrence of this scenario and its potential repercussions, see 
Brannon v. BankTrust, Inc., 50 So. 3d 397, 399–400 (Ala. 2010) (discussing liability for 
losses where an attorney hired to assist with estate administration initiated several transac-
tions payable to his law firm which were honored by the bank notwithstanding the fact that 
he was not authorized to make transactions against the estate’s account). 
5 See id. 
6 See id. 
7 For an actual occurrence of this scenario and its potential repercussions, see Valley 
Bank of Ronan v. Hughes, 147 P.3d 185, 188–89 (Mont. 2006) (discussing liability for losses 
where a customer received solicitation from a purported humanitarian asking for help 
with the purchase of farming equipment for a needy foreign village). A bank check, also 
known as a bank draft, is a check “where the payment is guaranteed to be available by 
[the] issuing bank.” See Bank Draft, Investopedia, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/ 
b/bank_draft.asp (last visited Oct. 20, 2013). 
8 See Valley Bank, 147 P.3d at 188–89. 
9 See id. 
10 See id. 
11 See id. 
12 See BAI Payments Connect, Check Fraud: Why Are Losses Trending Down? 3 
(2013) (noting that losses from check fraud totaled $893 million in 2010); see also Adams v. 
Martinsville DuPont Credit Union, 573 F. Supp. 2d 103, 113 (D.D.C. 2008) (discussing 
liability from fraud arising from the theft of a customer’s checkbook); In re World Metals, 
Inc., 313 B.R. 720, 723 (Bankr. D. Ohio 2004) (discussing liability from an employee fraud 
case involving alleged embezzlement perpetrated by a bankrupt employer’s bookkeeper). 
13 See Advance Dental Care, Inc. v. SunTrust Bank, 816 F. Supp. 2d 268, 270–71 (D. 
Md. 2011) (discussing liability for fraud losses where an office manager signed check pay-
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law controls the parties’ rights, duties, and liabilities.14 On the one 
hand, Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code set out a sys-
tem of rights and liabilities for check fraud in which unavoidable losses 
are allocated to the banks, whereas avoidable losses are generally allo-
cated to the “best loss avoider.”15 As a practical matter, the best loss 
avoider is generally the customer.16 Furthermore, even where other 
Code provisions do not allocate loss to the customer, the Code also 
provides a strict statute of limitations for claims that may preclude a 
customer from recovery.17 
 Thus, customer-plaintiffs may wish to advance common law claims 
such as negligence to avoid these limitations.18 But courts disagree 
about whether and to what extent common law negligence claims are 
valid under the Code.19 And to extent that courts allow common law 
negligence claims, they disagree as to the appropriate analytical pre-
emption test.20 For example, some courts ask whether the Code pro-
vides a comprehensive set of rights and remedies to the parties in the 
dispute.21 Other courts ask whether the underlying factual circum-
                                                                                                                      
ments from insurance companies over to herself and deposited them in her personal 
checking account); Chi. Title Ins. Co. v. Allfirst Bank, 905 A.2d 366, 377 (Md. 2005) (dis-
cussing liability for fraud losses where an account holder deposited a bank check—
intended to pay off his first mortgage as part of a refinancing—into his personal checking 
account); see also Sarah Howard Jenkins, Preemption & Supplementation Under Revised 1–103: 
The Role of Common Law & Equity in the New U.C.C., 54 SMU L. Rev. 495, 499 (2001) 
(“Courts have wrestled with the coordination of supplemental law and U.C.C. provisions in 
over 600 cases between 1964 and 1999.”). 
14 See Jenkins, supra note 13, at 499; see also Allfirst Bank, 905 A.2d at 377 (illustrating dis-
agreement over whether UCC or common law applies in check fraud scenarios); C-Wood 
Lumber Co. v. Wayne Cty. Bank, 233 S.W.3d 263, 281–82 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (same). 
15 See U.C.C. §§ 3-102, 4-102 (2002) (illustrating the scope of these provisions); Bryan 
D. Hull, Common Law Negligence and Loss Allocation: Has the Common Law Supplemented or 
Supplanted the U.C.C.?, 51 Ohio St. L. J. 605, 606 (1990) (discussing “best loss avoider”); A. 
Brooke Overby, Check Fraud in the Courts After the Revisions to U.C.C. Articles 3 and 4, 57 Ala. 
L. Rev. 351, 354–55 (2005). 
16 James Steven Rogers, The End of Negotiable Instruments 124 (2012). 
17 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 3-118 (providing a three-year statute of limitations for actions re-
garding the conversion of instruments); Overby, supra note 15, at 390. 
18 See Overby, supra note 15, at 390. 
19 See Hull, supra note 15, at 610–11; Overby, supra note 15, at 390–91; infra notes 21–
24 and accompanying text (illustrating the disparate analyses and outcomes reached by 
courts). 
20 See Hull, supra note 15, at 610–11; Overby, supra note 15, at 390–91; infra notes 21–
24 and accompanying text (illustrating the disparate analyses and outcomes reached by 
courts). 
21 See, e.g., AmSouth Bank v. Tice, 923 So. 2d 1060, 1066 (Ala. 2005); C-Wood Lumber, 
233 S.W.3d at 281–82. 
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stances fall within the Code’s scope of coverage.22 And at least one ju-
risdiction employs a textual analysis of the Code’s provisions to deter-
mine whether the Code’s plain meaning preempts common law 
claims.23 Regardless of the chosen inquiry, common law negligence 
claims are occasionally permitted.24 
 This Note advocates for the “comprehensive rights and remedies 
approach” to evaluating common law negligence claims in check fraud 
scenarios, but suggests revisions to the current Articles 3 and 4 scheme 
to address fairness issues identified by the courts.25 Part I discusses 
common forms of check fraud and explains the history and mechanics 
of the loss allocation scheme under Articles 3 and 4.26 Part II examines 
the courts’ analyses of common law negligence claims under the Code 
for check fraud scenarios.27 Part III argues that common law negli-
gence claims probably should not be allowed based on a strict reading 
of the Code.28 Recognizing the limited circumstances in which courts 
have allowed common law negligence claims—and the minimal impact 
they have had on predictability—however, Part III recommends revi-
sions to the check fraud allocation scheme based on the results reached 
by courts, which better reflect the broader goal of consumer protection 
articulated in payment systems generally.29 Finally, Part III suggests that 
the check fraud loss allocation scheme provides a latent benefit to the 
payment system as a whole by encouraging customers to move toward 
electronic payments.30 
                                                                                                                      
22 See, e.g., Notredan, LLC v. Old Republic Exch. Facilitator Co., 875 F. Supp. 2d 780, 
788 (W.D. Tenn. 2012); Allfirst Bank, 905 A.2d at 377. 
23 See Van Der Werff v. Shawmut Bank Conn., No. CV 950554654, 1996 WL 686916, at 
*3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 20, 1996). 
24 Compare, e.g., Sebastian v. D&S Express, Inc., 61 F. Supp. 2d 386, 387 (D.N.J. 1999) 
(holding that a common law negligence claim was preempted because the Code provided 
a comprehensive remedy for a company whose president was engaged in a fictitious payee 
check fraud scheme), with In re Clear Advantage Title, 438 B.R. 58, 65 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2010) 
(carving out an exception for common law negligence claims under the Code where a 
“special relationship” existed between the parties, such as one created by fiduciary, confi-
dential, contractual, or legal duties). 
25 See infra notes 31–288 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 31–144 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 145–220 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 226–246 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 247–276 and accompanying text. 
30 See infra notes 277–288 and accompanying text. 
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I. Check Fraud, the UCC, and Loss Allocation  
Under Articles 3 and 4 
 Check fraud has been a widespread and widely known phenome-
non since the beginning of negotiable instruments law.31 In many ways, 
check fraud is easier to commit today than ever before: automated 
check processing systems have rendered physical review of checks a 
thing of the past, and simple desktop publishing software has made it 
easier than ever to make a convincing forgery at home.32 Despite the 
prevalence of check fraud, however, the United States remains tied to 
the check as a significant payment method for consumers and busi-
nesses alike.33 In 2010, for example, U.S. businesses and consumers 
used more than 8 billion checks to pay for everything from rent and 
employee wages to the bus costs for school field trips.34 Each check cost 
approximately 43 cents to process, for a total cost of $3.4 billion.35 That 
same year, losses from check fraud totaled $893 million.36 
 Section A of this Part provides background information on the 
different types of check fraud and the Code’s allocation scheme for 
losses resulting from such fraud.37 Section B of this Part discusses the 
                                                                                                                      
31 See BAI Payments Connect, supra note 12, at 3. See also generally Price v. Neal, 
(1762) 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (K.B.) (holding that the bank is liable for paying unauthorized 
drafts). Check fraud even made its way into popular culture when America’s most famous 
check fraudster, Frank Abagnale, provided the backdrop for the 2002 Hollywood block-
buster Catch Me If You Can. See Catch Me If You Can (DreamWorks 2002). This movie 
grossed $352.1 million, making it the eleventh-highest-earning movie in 2002. See 2002 
Worldwide Grosses, Box Office Mojo, http://www.boxofficemojo.com/yearly/chart/?view2 
=worldwide&yr=2002&p=.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2013). 
32 See Check Fraud Working Group, Check Fraud: A Guide to Avoiding Losses 1 
(1999) [hereinafter Check Fraud Guide], available at http://www.occ.gov/publications/ 
publications-by-type/other-publications-reports/pub-other-check-fraud.pdf. The Check Fraud 
Working Group is “a subgroup of the interagency Bank Fraud Working Group” and is com-
prised of “representatives from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice, 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve Board, Internal Revenue Service, 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Office of Thrift Supervision, U.S. Postal Inspection 
Service, National Credit Union Administration, and U.S. Secret Service.” Id. 
33 See 97 Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. Ann. Rep. tbl.12 (2011) [hereinaf-
ter 2010 Annual Report], available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/annual- 
report/statistical-tables/2010-statistical-table12.htm. 
34 See id. 
35 See Paul W. Bauer & Geoffrey R. Gerdes, The Check Is Dead! Long Live the Check! A Check 
21 Update, Econ. Comment., June 2009, at 1, 3 fig.2, available at http://www.cleveland 
fed.org/research/commentary/2009/0609.cfm (check processing costs); 2010 Annual Re-
port, supra note 33 (illustrating that over eight billion checks were processed by the federal 
government in 2010). 
36 BAI Payments Connect, supra note 12, at 3. 
37 See infra notes 39–128 and accompanying text. 
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history of Articles 3 and 4 and the intersection of their provisions with 
common law negligence claims.38 
A. The UCC and Check Fraud 
 This Section explains the check collection process and how it fa-
cilitates check fraud.39 It also discusses how alterations and forgeries 
are commonly used to commit check fraud.40 
1. Fraud Based on the Check Collection Process 
 The check collection process often contributes to check fraud.41 
This process has been historically paper based and has essentially fol-
lowed the check.42 The person writing the check, known as the 
“drawer,” gives the check to the beneficiary, who in turn presents it to 
his or her bank to begin the collection process.43 The beneficiary’s 
bank, known as the “depositary bank,” then forwards the check’s in-
formation to the drawer’s bank, known as the “payor bank.”44 The 
payor bank receives the information and sends funds to the depositary 
bank as indicated on the check.45 Upon receiving the funds, the deposi-
tary bank applies them to the beneficiary’s account to complete the 
payment.46 
                                                                                                                      
38 See infra notes 129–144 and accompanying text. 
39 See infra notes 41–60 and accompanying text. 
40 See infra notes 61–128 and accompanying text. 
41 See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 458 U.S. 279, 281 n.1 (1982) (illustrating a typical 
check fraud scheme); James Steven Rogers, The Basic Principle of Loss Allocation for Unauthorized 
Checks, 39 Wake Forest L. Rev. 453, 456 (2004) (explaining the check collection process). 
42 See Peter J. Mucklestone, The Journey of a Check, Prof. Lawyer, 2006, at 39, 39 (ex-
plaining that the check collection process was historically paper based); Rogers, supra note 
41, at 456 (explaining the check collection process). 
43 See Rogers, supra note 41, at 456; see also U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(3) (2002) (“‘Drawer’ 
means a person who signs or is identified in a draft as a person ordering payment.”). 
44 See Rogers, supra note 41, at 456; see also U.C.C. § 4-105(2) (“‘Depositary bank’ 
means the first bank to take an item even though it is also the payor bank, unless the item 
is presented for immediate payment over the counter.”); id. § 4-105(3) (“‘Payor bank’ 
means a bank that is the drawee of a draft.”). 
45 See Rogers, supra note 41, at 456–57. 
46 See id. at 456. The inefficiency of the system is apparent when it is considered in ref-
erence to electronic payment systems. See id. With electronic transfers, the originator gives 
instructions for payment to its own bank, which sends the funds to the beneficiary’s bank, 
which in turn applies the funds to the beneficiary’s account. See id. This process avoids the 
burdensome and inefficient back-and-forth required by the paper check collection proc-
ess. See id.; supra notes 43--45 and accompanying text (describing the paper check collec-
tion process). 
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 Nevertheless, the 2003 Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act 
(Check 21 Act), provided the legislative stamp of approval for electronic 
presentment.47 Today, banks often remove a physical check from circu-
lation and electronically transmit either an image of the check or the 
check’s “MICR” information to the payor bank for collection.48 This 
image becomes the legal equivalent of the paper check and can be used 
the same way as the original check.49 Thus, electronic presentment pro-
vides a time- and cost-saving alternative to paper-based collection.50 
 Although electronic presentment is much faster than the paper-
based presentment process that preceded it, the collection process is 
not instantaneous and the so-called “check float” phenomenon re-
mains.51 Because of funds availability rules, there are often several days 
between the date of deposit and the date that funds are actually received 
                                                                                                                      
47 See Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act (Check 21 Act), Pub. L. No. 108-100, 
§ 4(b), 117 Stat. 1177, 1180 (2003) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5003(b) (2012)); 
Mucklestone, supra note 42, at 39–41. 
48 See Mucklestone, supra note 42, at 41. “MICR” stands for “magnetic ink character 
recognition.” See Check Fraud Guide, supra note 32, at 2; Check 21 Act Frequently Asked 
Questions, FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/21actfaq/ (last updated Oct. 
26, 2004). The MICR line on a check provides the information necessary to process a 
check: the payor bank’s routing number, the drawer’s account number, and the check 
number. See Check Fraud Guide, supra note 32, at 2; Check 21 Act Frequently Asked Ques-
tions, supra; see also Overby, supra note 15, at 360 n.60 (describing the manipulation of 
MICR lines by fraudsters to slow the check collection process and elongate the float time—
the time between when funds from a deposited check become available and when the 
bank receives the funds from the payor bank—to allow more time for fraudulent transac-
tions). 
49 See 12 U.S.C. § 5003(b); Mucklestone, supra note 42, at 41. This means that a substi-
tute of a fraudulent original will be subject to the same rules as the original would have 
been. See 12 U.S.C. § 5003(b); Mucklestone, supra note 42, at 41. 
50 See Mucklestone, supra note 42, at 40. Despite the conception of the Check 21 Act 
prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the attacks further highlighted the paper-based check 
system’s vulnerability because air freight was grounded for several days after the attacks, 
grinding the check system to a halt. See Bauer & Gerdes, supra note 35, at 1. In the days 
following the 9/11 attacks, “Grounded checks peaked at a value of over $45 billion.” Id. 
For more information on the intersection of the terrorist attacks and the financial com-
munity, see generally 88 Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. Ann. Rep. (2001), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/annual01/ar01.pdf. 
51 See Expedited Funds Availability Act, 12 U.S.C. § 4002 (2012) (prescribing funds 
availability schedules that interact with the time required for check clearing to produce 
float); Regulation CC, 12 C.F.R. § 229.12 (2013) (same); see also James McAndrews & Wil-
liam Roberds, The Economics of Check Float, 85 Ec. Rev. 17, 18–20 (2000), available at http:// 
www.frbatlanta.org/filelegacydocs/roberds.pdf (discussing check float as an explanation for 
the continued prevalence of payments by check in the United States); Michelle Singletary, 
Technology Sinks the Check Float, Wash. Post (Mar. 15, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost. 
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/14/AR2007031402244.html (discussing conversion 
of payments under $25,000 from check to electronic-based automated clearinghouse pay-
ments as a way to reduce the risk of loss from check float). 
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by the depositary bank.52 Thus, the customer has access to the funds 
represented by the check before the check has affirmatively been hon-
ored by the payor bank.53 “Check kiting,” a common type of check 
fraud, takes advantage of this float period by depositing a fraudulent 
check in one account, then drawing the funds during the float period 
and depositing them in another account.54 Float also underlies scams 
known as “Nigerian check fraud schemes,” in which someone receives a 
check from a supposed humanitarian with instructions to deposit the 
check and wire a portion of the funds to another account as soon as the 
funds become available.55 The fraudster receives the wire and withdraws 
the funds immediately, leaving the check’s recipient to bear the loss 
when the float period ends and the check is returned as fraudulent.56 
 The Code attempts to balance the benefits to customers of expe-
dited funds availability with the potential risk for fraud created by 
float.57 The Code prescribes certain deadlines for banks to either credit 
a customer’s account for a deposit or to pay or return checks presented 
for payment from a customer’s account.58 But the bank also enjoys an 
unconditional right to charge back the customer’s account if a depos-
ited item is subsequently returned.59 This chargeback right is only lim-
                                                                                                                      
52 See 12 U.S.C. § 4002; 12 C.F.R. § 229.12 (implementing the Expedited Funds Avail-
ability Act schedule for making deposited funds available). 
53 See 12 U.S.C. § 4002; 12 C.F.R. § 229.12. 
54 See, e.g., Williams, 458 U.S. at 281 n.1 (illustrating a typical check kiting scheme). See gen-
erally Kiting, Legal Info. Inst. (Aug. 19, 2010, 5:18 PM), http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/ 
kiting (defining kiting and providing illustrations of common kiting schemes). 
55 See, e.g., Valley Bank, 147 P.3d at 189–90 (illustrating the classic Nigerian check fraud 
scheme). For a more extensive treatment of Nigerian check fraud schemes, see generally 
Clark H.C. Lacy, The Witch’s Brew: Nigerian Schemes, Counterfeit Cashier’s Checks, and Your Trust 
Account, 61 S.C. L. Rev. 753 (2010). 
56 See U.C.C. § 4-201(a) (2002) (indicating that the credit is provisional until the final 
settlement/funds are collected); id. § 4-202 (requiring a bank to timely return dishonored 
items in order for the bank to have presumptively exercised ordinary care in the return 
process); id. § 4-212(b) (indicating that the presenting bank can treat any item not re-
ceived by the close of business on the third day following presentment as if it were dishon-
ored by sending the drawer or indorser notice of the facts); id. § 4-214 (providing the right 
of chargeback to banks when provisional credit has been given to a customer, notwith-
standing the fact that the customer may have taken out the funds already); see also Valley 
Bank, 147 P.3d at 188–89 (describing this scheme); U.C.C. § 4-105(6) (describing a “pre-
senting bank” as “a bank presenting an item except a payor bank”). 
57 Compare Regulation CC, 12 C.F.R. § 229.12 (2013) (providing for the availability of 
funds before the check has cleared), with U.C.C. § 4-214 (providing banks with the right of 
chargeback). See McAndrews & Roberds, supra note 51, at 18–22. 
58 See U.C.C. § 4-214. 
59 See id. 
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ited by the requirement that the bank must share liability for whatever 
losses were caused by its own delay in returning the item.60 
2. Fraud on the Instrument 
a. Types of Fraud 
 At the broadest level, fraud on the check itself takes two forms: 
alteration and forgery.61 An alteration is an unauthorized change in a 
check that modifies or changes the maker’s obligation or the payee’s 
right to payment.62 This includes any unauthorized addition of words 
or numbers to a completed check, as well as any additions or changes 
to an incomplete check.63 Thus, an alteration occurs when a fraudster 
takes a legitimate check and changes important information, such as 
the amount or payee.64 For example, Business X writes a check to 
Landscaper for $150 to pay for monthly grounds maintenance and 
sends it to Landscaper in the mail.65 Usurper takes Landscaper’s mail, 
check and all, and notices that there is enough blank space to the right 
of Landscaper’s name and the amount to change the payment informa-
tion to “Landscaper or Usurper, $150,000” using his home publishing 
software.66 Usurper makes the changes and brings the check to his 
bank for deposit.67 Alternatively, Business X’s Bookkeeper may begin 
writing a check to Landscaper, inputting the amount, signing the 
check, and writing “Landscaper, February” in the Memo line—but leav-
ing the Order line blank.68 Usurper, a janitor at Business X, takes the 
check from Bookkeeper’s desk, writes in his name on the Order line, 
and cashes the check at his bank.69 
                                                                                                                      
60 See id. 
61 See Check Fraud Guide, supra note 32, at 2–10; see also Rogers, supra note 41 at 453–
54 (noting that Articles 3 and 4 allocate losses from forged indorsements or altered in-
struments). 
62 See U.C.C. § 3-407(a) (2002) (defining “alteration”); see also Suffolk Credit Union v. 
Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, No. 10-2763 (GEB), 2011 WL 830262, at *7 (D.N.J. March 7, 2011) 
(illustrating an alteration scheme). See generally Rogers, supra note 16 (discussing the his-
tory of alteration and its treatment by the courts). For Code purposes, a check is an in-
strument, but not all instruments are checks. See U.C.C. § 3-104(f). 
63 See U.C.C. § 3-407(a). 
64 See Check Fraud Guide, supra note 32, at 2. 
65 See id. at 3. 
66 See id. 
67 See id. 
68 See id. 
69 See id. 
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 The Code initially allocates losses from alterations to the deposi-
tary bank.70 Using the first illustration above, the unauthorized altera-
tion would discharge Business X’s obligation under the instrument ex-
cept as according to its original terms ($150 to Landscaper).71 In the 
second example, though, payment to Usurper was, effectively, part of 
the check’s original terms since Bookkeeper left the Order line blank.72 
Thus, the check would be enforceable against Business X according to 
the completed terms so long as Bank took the item for value, in good 
faith, and without notice of the alteration.73 
 Forgery comes in many more flavors than alteration, but it has two 
main varieties.74 In the first, the fraudster forges the drawer’s signature 
on a check payable from the drawer’s account.75 For instance, assume 
that Usurper, a janitor at Business X, steals a check from Bookkeeper’s 
desk, marks it “Payable to the Order of Usurper, $4,500.00,” and forges 
Bookkeeper’s authorizing signature on the signature line.76 Usurper 
has forged the drawer’s signature on the check.77 In the second type of 
forgery, the fraudster forges the beneficiary’s indorsement on a check 
written by the drawer and signs it over to himself.78 For example, as-
sume that Usurper steals a check from Bookkeeper’s desk bearing 
                                                                                                                      
70 See U.C.C. § 3-407 (2002) (placing the loss from alterations initially on the payor 
bank, requiring it to recredit the customer’s account for any amount above the originally 
authorized amount); id. § 4-208(a) (providing a warranty against alterations to the payor 
bank, allowing the payor bank to recover the amount of the alteration from the depositary 
bank). 
71 See id. § 3-407(c). 
72 See id. 
73 See id. Within the context of liability for alterations, a payor bank takes a check for 
value when it incurs an obligation to pay the third party presenting it for payment. See id. 
§ 3-303(a)(5). “Good faith” means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable com-
mercial standards of fair dealing. See id. § 3-103(a)(4). A person has notice when the per-
son actually knows the fact, has received a notification duly delivered in a form reasonable 
under the circumstances at the recipient’s place of business or another location held out 
to be the appropriate forum for sending notices, or where the person should have known 
the information based on all the facts and circumstances known to the person at the time 
in question. See id. § 1-202. 
74 See Check Fraud Guide, supra note 32, at 4–22 (describing various forgery-based 
check fraud schemes); Rogers, supra note 41, at 457–62. 
75 See Rogers, supra note 41, at 455–56; see also U.C.C. § 4-401 cmt. 1 (providing that 
“[a]n item containing a forged drawer’s signature . . . is not properly payable”). 
76 See Rogers, supra note 41at 458–59; see also U.C.C. § 4-401 (2002) (providing for 
when a bank may charge a customer’s account). 
77 See Rogers, supra note 41, at 458–59; see also U.C.C. § 4-401 (defining properly pay-
able items and when the bank may pay them). 
78 See Lee Newman, 87 Cal. App. 4th at 76 (describing a forged indorsement fraud); 
Rogers, supra note 41, at 458; see also U.C.C. § 4-401 cmt. 1. 
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Bookkeeper’s authorizing signature and made payable to Landscaper.79 
If Usurper signs on behalf of Landscaper to transfer the check to him-
self and then presents the check for deposit at his own bank, he has 
forged the beneficiary’s indorsement.80 
 In either case, the Code initially places the loss on the banks be-
cause the items presented are not properly payable.81 The Code au-
thorizes the bank to pay only items which are properly payable.82 If the 
item is not authorized, or if the bank does not pay it in accordance with 
any agreements between itself and its customer, the item is not properly 
payable.83 In the forged indorsement scenario, the depositary bank 
takes the loss.84 In the forged drawer signature scenario, the payor 
bank takes the loss.85 Absent a defense, then, the Code allocates un-
avoidable forgery losses among the payment system providers, rather 
than its users.86 
b. Bank Defenses to Forgery and Alteration 
 Nevertheless, there are several defenses that allow banks to shift all 
or part of the losses from forgery and alteration to each other or to cus-
tomers.87 As between the banks, the payor bank (a “transferee” for pur-
poses of the presentment warranty) may be able to assert a breach of 
presentment warranty against the bank that transferred the check to it 
                                                                                                                      
79 See Rogers, supra note 41, at 457–58; see also U.C.C. § 4-401. 
80 See Rogers, supra note 41, at 457–58; see also U.C.C. § 4-401. 
81 Compare U.C.C. § 4-401(a) (describing that “[a] bank may charge against the ac-
count of a customer an item that is properly payable from the account even though the 
charge creates an overdraft,” where “[a]n item is properly payable if it is authorized by the 
customer and is in accordance with any agreement between the customer and bank”), with 
id. § 4-401 cmt. 1 (“An item containing a . . . forged indorsement is not properly pay-
able.”). See James J. White & Robert S. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 15-3 
(5th ed. 2000) (indicating that an item that is not properly payable cannot be charged to 
the customer’s account); Rogers, supra note 41, at 455 (citing Barkley Clark & Barbara 
Clark, 1 The Law of Bank Deposits, Collections and Credit Cards § 10.03[2] 
(2002)) (same). 
82 See U.C.C. § 4-401 (2002). 
83 See id. 
84 See id.; Rogers, supra note 41, at 465. 
85 See U.C.C. § 4-401; Rogers, supra note 41, at 465. 
86 See Rogers, supra note 41, at 466. 
87 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 3-404 (placing the risk of loss on customers in imposter or fictitious 
payee scenarios); id. § 3-405 (placing the risk of loss on employers in most employee em-
bezzlement scenarios); id. § 4-406 (placing a duty on customers to discover alteration or 
unauthorized signatures within thirty days of the related statement). 
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for payment (a “transferor,” typically the depositary bank).88 The pre-
sentment warranty requires the payor bank to show that the transferor 
had actual knowledge that the check was a forgery.89 Because the payor 
bank must prove that the depository bank had actual knowledge— 
rather than merely notice—the presentment warranty typically leaves 
the loss with the payor bank rather than the depositary bank.90 
 Although a payor bank may not be successful under a presentment 
warranty, the payor bank can almost always shift the loss from a forged 
indorsement or alteration to the depositary bank because of the Code’s 
transfer warranty.91 Where multiple banks form a chain of transfer, 
each bank in the chain makes a transfer warranty to each subsequent 
bank in the chain.92 Each transferee warrants that it was entitled to en-
force the check and that there were no alterations on it.93 Because most 
forged or altered checks are not enforceable, the payor bank can al-
most always shift the loss from a forged indorsement or alteration to 
the depositary bank.94 
 In the event that the loss falls on the payor bank, several additional 
defenses provide the means by which the bank may often transfer the 
risk of loss to its customer.95 First, the bank is not liable for a forgery or 
alteration where the customer’s failure to exercise ordinary care “sub-
stantially contributed” to the alteration or forgery and the bank paid 
the check or took it for value or collection in good faith.96 This de-
                                                                                                                      
 
88 See U.C.C. § 3-417 (2002); Overby, supra note 15, at 362–65. Under the Code, the 
bank sending the check for collection warrants that it is authorized to enforce the instru-
ment, and that the check is genuine free of alteration. See U.C.C. § 3-417; Overby, supra 
note 15, at 362–65. 
89 See U.C.C. § 3-417; Overby, supra note 15, at 362–65. 
90 See U.C.C. § 3-417; Overby, supra note 15, at 362–65. Compare U.C.C. § 1-202(b) 
(“‘Knowledge’ means actual knowledge.”), with id. § 1-202(a) (“[A] person has notice of a 
fact if the person: (1) has actual knowledge, (2) has received a notice or notification of it, 
or (3) from all the facts and circumstances known to the person at the time in question, 
has reason to know that it exists.”). 
91 See U.C.C. § 4-207 (presentment warranties); id. § 4-208 (transfer warranties). 
92 See U.C.C. §§ 4-207 to -208; Overby, supra note 15, at 362–65. 
93 See U.C.C. §§ 4-207 to -208 (2002); Overby, supra note 15, at 362–65. 
94 See U.C.C. §§ 4-207 to -208; Overby, supra note 15, at 362–65. Note, however, that the 
losses from a forged drawer’s signature remains with the payor bank because the items 
were not properly payable. See U.C.C. §§ 4-208, 4-401; Overby, supra note 15, at 362–65. 
95 See U.C.C. § 3-404 (fictitious payees and imposters); id. § 3-405 (employer’s respon-
sibility for fraudulent indorsement by employee); id. § 3-406 (negligence contributing to a 
forgery or alteration); id. § 3-417 (presentment warranties); id. § 4-207 (transfer warran-
ties); id. § 4-208 (presentment warranties); id. § 4-406 (customer’s duty to discover and 
report unauthorized signature or alteration). 
96 See U.C.C. §§ 3-404 to -406, 3-417, 4-207 to -208, 4-406; Overby, supra note 15, at 371–
72. “Substantial contribution” generally means that there is a causal connection between 
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fense, known as the “holder in due course” rule, is available regardless 
of whether the bank also acted negligently.97 This makes sense because, 
as between the bank and the customer, the customer was in the better 
position to have prevented the loss.98 
 A second defense deals with situations in which fraud is ongoing.99 
If a customer receives bank statements, the customer must notify the 
bank of any unauthorized payments within thirty days.100 If the cus-
tomer fails to notify the bank, it loses its right to recover for any subse-
quent fraudulent items made by the same fraudster.101 Here again, the 
bank may raise the defense regardless of its own negligence in handling 
the item.102 Assume that Usurper began forging checks from Business 
X’s account in January, with the first fraudulent item appearing on the 
statement dated January 31.103 Bookkeeper goes on vacation, leaving 
the unopened statement on her desk until March 13.104 Usurper, 
meanwhile, has negotiated seven more checks, totaling $10,000.105 Al-
though Bookkeeper notifies the bank upon opening the statements on 
March 13, Business X’s bank will only be liable for the first check; the 
rest are subject to the ongoing fraud defense.106 This rule makes sense 
                                                                                                                      
the customer’s negligence and the forgery or alteration. See Overby, supra note 15, at 371–
72. This causation standard “is meant to be less stringent than a direct and proximate 
cause test.” See U.C.C. § 3-406 cmt. 2. 
97 See U.C.C. § 3-406; Overby, supra note 15, at 371–72. This is a change from the pre-
1990 version of Article 3, which required the bank to have acted in accordance with rea-
sonable commercial standards in order to raise this defense. See Overby, supra note 15, at 
371–72. 
98 See Overby, supra note 15, at 359. 
99 See U.C.C. § 4-406 (2002). 
100 See id. The customer has a duty to report any items bearing forged drawer signa-
tures within thirty days of the receipt of the statement on which they appear. See id. If the 
fraud is continuous, the customer is precluded from asserting the forgery for all but the 
items passed within the thirty days after the receipt of the statement revealing the first 
fraudulent item. See id. Regardless of whether the forgery is ongoing or an isolated event, 
the customer has one year from the date of the statement showing the forged item in 
which to report the loss to the bank. See id. 
101 See id. This is true so long as the bank paid the item or items in good faith. See id. In 
addition, the bank must prove that it suffered a loss because of the customer’s failure to 
notify it in situations where the signature on the item was unauthorized or there was an 
alteration on the item. See id.; Overby, supra note 15, at 373. Because many fraud schemes 
involve ongoing fraud, this is a particularly potent defense. See Overby, supra note 15, at 
372–74. 
102 See Overby, supra note 15, at 372–74. 
103 See generally U.C.C. § 4-406 (providing a defense to banks for ongoing fraudulent 
transactions). 
104 See id. 
105 See U.C.C. § 4-406 (2002). 
106 See id. 
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as a policy matter because the customer could easily have avoided the 
subsequent losses by simply reviewing the bank statement and alerting 
the bank to the fraud.107 
 Third, the bank may assert a statute of limitations defense if the 
customer does not discover and report an unauthorized signature or 
alteration within one year of its appearance on a bank statement.108 
Assume that Usurper forges Bookkeeper’s signature on a check drawn 
from Business X’s account in January, but instead of opening the bank 
statements sent to Business X, Bookkeeper merely puts them in a desk 
drawer for the auditors.109 When the audit team arrives the following 
March and discovers the fraud, Business X’s bank has a complete de-
fense from liability because Business X waited more than a year to re-
port the fraud.110 
 Fourth, the Code places liability on the customer instead of the 
bank where the customer was duped into making payments to a ficti-
tious payee or to an imposter.111 In the fictitious payee scenario, a cus-
tomer is tricked into writing a check to satisfy a debt that is not actually 
owed.112 For instance, Usurper may send an invoice to Business X’s ac-
counts payable department requesting payment for grounds keeping 
services ostensibly performed for Business X during Landscaper’s sum-
mer vacation.113 Bookkeeper sends a check to Usurper, who indorses 
                                                                                                                      
107 See Overby, supra note 15, at 359. 
108 See U.C.C. § 4-406; Overby, supra note 15, at 373. 
109 See generally Cagle’s, Inc. v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 153 F. Supp. 2d 1288, 1298 (M.D. Ala. 
2001) (discussing the impact of common law negligence claims on the Code’s statute of 
limitation defense); Johnson Dev. Co. v. First Nat’l Bank of St. Louis, 999 S.W.2d 314, 318–
19 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (discussing one circumstance under which a common law negli-
gence claim would not impede the Code’s statute of limitations defense); U.C.C. § 4-406 
(providing a statute of limitations defense to banks on claims resulting from fraudulent 
transfers). 
110 See generally U.C.C. § 4-406. Of course, if the audit occurred in July, and Business X 
notified the Bank in August, the statute of limitations would not shield the bank from li-
ability. See id. Importantly, there is no statute of limitations imposed for fraudulent in-
dorsements of a payment to a third party. See id.; Overby, supra note 15, at 374. Assume now 
that Usurper stole a check that Business X had written to Landscaper and had forged 
Landscaper’s indorsement before cashing the check. See U.C.C. § 4-406. There would be 
no statute of limitations to preclude Business X from asserting that the item was fraudulent 
because the forgery was made to the payee’s indorsement, not the drawer’s signature. See id. 
111 See Peters Family Farm, 2011 WL 497467, at *1 (illustrating the typical fictitious payee 
scheme where the accountant had been appropriating checks that were signed by the 
company president to pay non-existent tax liabilities); U.C.C. § 3-404 (2002); Overby, supra 
note 15, at 374–75. 
112 See Overby, supra note 15, at 374–75 (describing this type of fraud). See generally 
U.C.C. § 3-404 (providing rules for fictitious payee scenarios). 
113 See generally U.C.C. § 3-404. 
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the check and cashes it at Business X’s bank.114 In the imposter sce-
nario, the customer would have written a check to make a legitimate 
payment, but delivered it to someone who was not actually the intended 
recipient’s agent.115 For another example, Usurper may place a call to 
Business X’s accounts payable department posing as Landscaper’s new 
accountant and requesting that payment for Landscaper’s services be 
forwarded to a new address.116 When Bookkeeper complies with this 
request, Usurper forges Landscaper’s indorsement and cashes the check 
for his own benefit at Business X’s bank.117 In both scenarios, the forged 
indorsement is deemed effective so long as the bank pays the item in 
good faith.118 Thus, the customer bears the loss because the customer is 
tasked with verifying its obligations and the status of any representatives 
with whom it works.119 
 Finally, the bank has a complete defense in situations where a 
fraudulent signature or indorsement is made by an employee entrusted 
with responsibility for instruments.120 Responsibility for instruments 
arises when an employee has authority to: sign or indorse instruments 
on behalf of the employer-customer; process instruments received by 
the employer for bookkeeping purposes, such as bringing deposits to 
the bank or making bookkeeping entries, or otherwise disposing of the 
instruments; or prepare payments in the employer-customer’s name.121 
For instance, Bookkeeper hires Usurper as an accounts payable officer 
at Business X.122 Usurper prepares a check for $150,000 payable to his 
                                                                                                                      
114 See id. 
115 See Overby, supra note 15, at 374–75 (describing this type of fraud). See generally 
U.C.C. § 3-404 (providing rules for imposter scenarios). 
116 See generally U.C.C. § 3-404 (providing rules for imposter scenarios). 
117 See U.C.C. § 3-404 (2002). 
118 See id. 
119 See Overby, supra note 15, at 375. 
120 See Cagle’s, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 1298 (holding a company liable for losses incurred 
when an accounts payable employee wrote large checks from the company account pay-
able to herself and deposited them in her personal bank account); C-Wood Lumber, 233 
S.W.3d at 281–82 (holding a lumber mill liable for losses where an employee-treasurer 
embezzled funds); U.C.C. § 3-405; Overby, supra note 15, at 375. 
121 See Cagle’s, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 1298; Sebastian, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 391 (involving fraud 
committed by former company president); C-Wood Lumber, 233 S.W.3d at 281–82; U.C.C. 
§ 3-405. Note that the employee may still have responsibility for instruments if the em-
ployee is authorized to “act otherwise with respect to instruments in a responsible capac-
ity.” See U.C.C. § 3-405. This does not include simple access to instruments or responsibility 
for storing or transporting incoming or outgoing mail, or other similar responsibilities. See 
id. 
122 See generally U.C.C. § 3-405 (providing the bank with a complete defense in situa-
tions where a fraudulent signature or indorsement is made by an employee entrusted with 
responsibility for instruments). 
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own side business, Business Y, and includes a fraudulent invoice to back 
up the payment.123 After Bookkeeper signs the check, Usurper indorses 
it over to himself and cashes it at Business X’s bank.124 Although a rea-
sonable person might think it highly unlikely that a business would sign 
a large check over to an individual, Business X will still take the loss be-
cause an employer is in the best position to avoid this type of loss 
through employee supervision and oversight.125 
 In sum, the Code begins with the premise that the bank takes the 
loss for fraudulent or altered items, and then provides a series of de-
fenses for the bank to use to recover part or all of the loss.126 This re-
covery can come from other banks in the form of presentment or 
transfer warranties.127 In addition, Banks may recover from customers 
by exercising defenses for comparative negligence, the holder in due 
course provision, failure to review bank statements, statute of limita-
tions, fictitious payee liability, or the employer negligence provision.128 
B. The Intersection of Articles 3 and 4 and Common Law Negligence 
 Commentators level significant criticism at the loss allocation pro-
visions in Articles 3 and 4.129 This criticism stems in large part from the 
fact that the revised loss allocation system shifted certain losses from 
the banking system to the customers who use it, regardless of whether 
                                                                                                                      
123 See U.C.C. § 3-405 (2002). 
124 See id. 
125 See id.; Overby, supra note 15, at 375–76. Employee supervision and oversight is a 
more effective method of preventing losses from this type of fraud than requiring banks to 
make an inquiry of Usurper at presentment or of Business X before payment to Usurper. 
See Overby, supra note 15, at 372. 
126 See U.C.C. § 3-404 (imposters and fictitious payees); id. § 3-405 (employer’s respon-
sibility for fraudulent indorsement by employee); id. § 4-401 (when banks may charge cus-
tomer accounts); id. § 4-406 (customer’s duty to discover and report unauthorized signa-
ture or alteration). 
127 See U.C.C. § 3-416 (transfer warranties); id. § 3-417 (presentment warranties); id. 
§ 4-207 (transfer warranties); id. § 4-208 (presentment warranties). 
128 See U.C.C. §§ 3-404 to -405, 4-406; id. § 3-406 (negligence contributing to a forged 
signature or alteration of instrument). 
129 See, e.g., Frederick K. Beutel, The Proposed Uniform Commercial Code Should Not Be 
Adopted, 61 Yale L. J. 334, 335 (1952) (describing Article 4 as “an unfair piece of class legis-
lation . . . [that] will probably be declared unconstitutional in many states”); Gail K. Hille-
brand, Revised Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code: A Consumer Perspective, 42 Ala. 
L. Rev. 679, 697–98 (1991); Hull, supra note 15, at 610–11; Overby, supra note 15, at 352 
(citing Juliana J. Zekan, Comparative Negligence Under the Code: Protecting Negligent Banks 
Against Negligent Customers, 26 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 125, 166–76 (1992). 
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the rules, as applied, result in arguably unfair outcomes.130 After the 
revisions, banks have no duty to inspect items received for deposit, de-
spite prior case law in certain jurisdictions that held otherwise and of-
ten allowed customers to recover losses from the banks.131 
 Additionally, ordinary care is the post-revision standard with which 
banks must comply when processing checks, but it requires only that 
banks “[observe] reasonable commercial standards prevailing in the 
area in which the [bank] is located, with respect to [the banking indus-
try generally],” leading one commentator to summarize the rule as re-
quiring banks to simply do “whatever anyone else is doing.”132 This is 
viewed as problematic because banks are free to lower the level of secu-
rity provided in the check processing system without bearing additional 
liability for fraudulent checks.133 
 Comparing the Article 3 and 4 loss allocation scheme with the al-
location scheme for electronic payments under federal laws and regula-
tions and the Code’s Article 4A further enhances the perception of Ar-
ticles 3 and 4’s allocation provisions as inequitable.134 Federal 
                                                                                                                      
130 See, e.g., Bradley v. First Nat’l Bank of Walker, 711 N.W.2d 121, 127 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2006) (placing the risk of loss on a customer even where the bank allowed a non-signer to 
initiate transactions from the customer’s account); Valley Bank, 147 P.3d at 192 (noting that 
a customer bore the obligation to repay the bank for chargeback under section 4-214, 
notwithstanding the customer’s reliance on information from bank personnel when initi-
ating the underlying transaction); Overby, supra note 15, at 388. The banking industry is 
still absorbing substantial fraud losses, however, because not all check fraud situations in-
volve provable negligence or trigger any of the defenses available to banks. Overby, supra 
note 15, at 387–88; see Hillebrand, supra note 129, at 697–98. For a comprehensive discus-
sion of the policies and issues considered during the revision process of Articles 3 and 4, 
see generally Edward L. Rubin, Policies and Issues in the Proposed Revision of Articles 3 and 4 of 
the U.C.C., 43 Bus. Law. 621 (1988). For a more complete and nuanced summary of the 
changes to Articles 3 and 4 during the 1990 revisions, see generally Alvin C. Harrell & Fred 
H. Miller, The New U.C.C. Articles 3 and 4: Impact on Banking Operations, 47 Consumer Fin. 
L.Q. Rep. 283 (1993). 
131 See U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(9) (2002) (defining ordinary care and noting that reasonable 
commercial standards do not require sight review unless bank policies require sight re-
view); Overby, supra note 15, at 379; see also Medford Irrigation Dist. v. W. Bank, 676 P.2d 
329, 332–33 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that the absence of any review for items under 
$5000 did not meet the bank’s duty to exercise ordinary care). 
132 See U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(9); Overby, supra note 15, at 379–80. 
133 See Overby, supra note 15, at 353, 380. For a discussion of the conflict between free-
dom of contract and the finality doctrine under Articles 3 and 4, see generally Michael 
Coutu, Note, Check Fraud and the Variation of Section 4-401: Why Banks Should Not Be Able to 
Vary the U.C.C.’s Standard Risk Allocation Scheme, 54 B.C. L. Rev. 275 (2013). 
134 See Fair Credit Billing Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1666 (2012) (providing caps on consumer li-
ability for credit card fraud); Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (2012) (pro-
viding caps on consumer liability for debit card fraud); Regulation CC, 12 C.F.R. § 229.12 
(2013) (providing funds availability timetables for deposited checks); U.C.C. § 4A-102 
(specifically foreclosing resort to outside areas of law in electronic payments). 
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consumer debit and credit card fraud loss allocation rules are particu-
larly customer friendly.135 If a fraudster uses a customer’s card number 
to initiate fraudulent transactions but the customer did not lose the 
debit or credit card, the customer’s liability for those losses is capped at 
$50, provided that the customer reports the loss within sixty days of the 
statement showing the transactions.136 If the fraud occurred because 
the customer lost the debit or credit card, a consumer’s liability ranges 
between $0 and $500, again provided that the customer notifies the 
bank of the fraud within sixty days of the statement showing the trans-
actions.137 Like the Articles 3 and 4 scheme, these approaches maintain 
the customer’s duty to review account statements.138 Unlike Articles 3 
and 4, however, the loss allocation scheme for debit and credit card-
based fraud places a cap on liability when the customer notifies the 
bank of the theft.139 
 The Code’s loss allocation for fraudulent electronic transfers is 
likewise more balanced.140 Article 4A covers electronic funds transfers 
by wire, ACH, and credit or debit cards.141 Article 4A provides that the 
                                                                                                                      
135 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666, 1693. 
136 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666, 1693; Lost or Stolen Credit, Debit, and ATM Cards, Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0213-lost-or-stolen-credit-atm-and-debit-cards 
(last visited Oct. 20, 2013). 
137 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666, 1693; Lost or Stolen Credit, Debit, and ATM Cards, supra note 
136. 
138 Compare 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666, 1693 (imposing a duty on customers to report frauds 
within sixty days of loss), with U.C.C. § 4-406 (2002) (imposing a duty on customers to 
review statements). The customer’s liability for fraud losses increases from $0 for notifica-
tion before any fraudulent transactions are posted to a maximum of $500 if the customer 
notifies the bank within 60 days of the statement date. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666, 1693. 
139 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666, 1693. This is a markedly different result than the likely results 
under the Code. See Valley Bank, 147 P.3d at 189–92 (describing how one defrauded person 
was forced to cash in his pension account and take out a second mortgage to satisfy a debt 
owed to his bank from the operation of a chargeback provision); U.C.C. § 4-214 (2002) 
(bank’s right of chargeback). 
140 See U.C.C. § 4A-202; infra notes 141–144 and accompanying text (illustrating this 
proposition). 
141 See U.C.C. § 4A-102. The Federal Reserve processes checks, ACH, and wires. See 
Mucklestone, supra note 42, at 43–45. The national wire transfer system, known as Fedwire, 
is ideal for businesses or consumers making large or time-sensitive, one-time electronic 
payments through the Federal Reserve. See id. The “automated clearinghouse system,” or 
ACH, is another popular electronic payment system commonly used by consumers and 
businesses alike for recurring expenses, such as payroll, taxes, utility payments, credit card 
payments, and the like. See id. at 44. The Federal Reserve processed approximately 11.45 
billion items totaling $21.37 trillion via ACH in 2010. See 2010 Annual Report, supra note 
33, at tbl.12. Credit and debit cards are two types of popular payment methods, especially 
for point-of-sale or online transactions. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 75 
Fed. Reg. 81,725, 81,725–26 (Dec. 28, 2010); Mucklestone, supra note 42, at 44. 
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bank will take the loss for fraudulent electronic payments unless the 
parties have agreed upon the use of a commercially reasonable security 
procedure to authenticate the customer’s payment orders, and the 
bank proves that it complied with the security procedure and any other 
written agreement or customer instructions in accepting the payment 
order and that it acted in good faith.142 
 Commercial reasonableness requires that the security procedure 
reflect the wishes of the customer expressed to the bank; the circum-
stances of the customer known to the bank, including the size, type, 
and frequency of payment orders normally issued by the customer to 
the bank; alternative security procedures offered to but declined by the 
customer; and security procedures in general use by customers and 
banks similarly situated.143 Because it has an objective, industry-wide 
element and a subjective, customer-specific element, this standard is 
much stricter than the “what everyone else is doing” standard that de-
fines ordinary care for check fraud liability purposes.144 
                                                                                                                      
 
142 See U.C.C. § 4A-201 to -202. At least one court has held that banks cannot reach 
their defenses in the Code’s electronic funds transfer loss allocation provisions unless they 
use commercially reasonable security procedures to verify online payments. See Patco 
Constr. Co. v. People’s United Bank, 684 F.3d 197, 209 (1st Cir. 2012). For a discussion of 
commercial reasonableness under Article 4A, see generally Melissa Waite, Comment, In 
Search of the Right Balance: Patco Lays the Foundation for Analyzing the Commercial Reasonable-
ness of Security Procedures under U.C.C. Article 4A, 54 B.C. L. Rev. E. Supp. 217 (2013), 
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol54/iss6/17/. Interestingly, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Patco considered whether the Code displaced a common 
law negligence claim. See 684 F.3d at 216. The court held that it did, on the facts presented, 
because the Code defined both the standard for the duty of care and its limitation on li-
ability. See id. 
143 See U.C.C. § 4A-202. Most banks follow the Federal Financial Institution Examina-
tion Council’s recommendations for online payment security. See Fed. Fin. Insts. Exami-
nation Council, Authentication in an Internet Banking Environment 2–3 (2005), 
http://www.ffiec.gov/pdf/authentication_guidance.pdf. These guidelines recommend 
that security procedures include something that a user knows, something that a user is, 
and something that a user has. See id. A password and an ATM PIN are common examples 
of something that a user knows which will verify his or her identity. See id. An ATM card 
and a security token are common examples of something that a user has to verify his or 
her identity. See id. A security token is a small device, often attached to a keychain, that 
displays a code that the user must input into the online payment system to verify a transac-
tion. See id. The code changes at set intervals, usually one minute. See id. These items are 
combined with something unique to the user, such as the user’s IP address, fingerprint, or 
voice. See id. Successfully initiating a fraudulent transaction in a system that incorporates all 
of these features is much more difficult than cashing a fraudulent paper check with a 
forged signature on it, especially now that checks are processed electronically. See id. 
144 See U.C.C. § 4A-202; Overby, supra note 15, at 380. It bears mentioning that if the 
bank proves that its security procedures were commercially reasonable, the customer will 
take the loss unless the customer can prove that the perpetrator was not someone en-
trusted with duties to act for the customer relating to payment orders or the security pro-
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II. Courts Take Different Approaches to  
Common Law Negligence 
 This Part begins by discussing the uncertain status of common law 
negligence claims under the Uniform Commercial Code.145 It then dis-
cusses the various interpretive approaches that courts use to determine 
whether negligence claims should be preempted by the Code’s provi-
sions.146 
A. Common Law Negligence Under the Code 
 Customers who are victims of fraudulent transactions often pursue 
common law causes of action to avoid the statute of limitations, the cus-
tomer’s duty to review statements, or the bank’s right of chargeback as 
provided by the Code.147 Because these plaintiffs are often sympathetic, 
there is a strong temptation for courts to allow these claims when viewed 
in the context of Articles 3 and 4’s history and pro-bank image.148 
 But the Code is not clear as to whether and under what contexts 
common law claims should be allowed in check fraud scenarios because 
Articles 3 and 4 have no explicit preemption provision.149 Some view 
section 3-406 as explicitly displacing common law negligence actions 
because it requires an analysis substantially similar to that of common 
law comparative negligence.150 In this view, a common law action that 
                                                                                                                      
 
cedure, and that he or she did not obtain access to transmitting facilities of the customer 
or information facilitating a breach of the security procedure from a source controlled by 
the customer. See U.C.C. § 4A-202. This means that, like in check fraud liability, unavoid-
able losses in the payment system are borne by the banks, but avoidable losses (like em-
ployee embezzlement or weak Internet security at a customer’s office that allows hackers to 
access the banking system) will be borne by the party best able to have prevented the loss. 
See id.; Overby, supra note 15, at 380; Rogers, supra note 41, at 466. 
145 See infra notes 147–175 and accompanying text. 
146 See infra notes 176–220 and accompanying text. 
147 See U.C.C. § 4-406 (2002) (customer’s duty to check statements); id. § 4-111 (statute 
of limitations); id. § 4-214 (right of chargeback); Overby, supra note 15, at 390. 
148 See, e.g., Valley Bank of Ronan v. Hughes, 147 P.3d 185, 192 (Mont. 2006) (describ-
ing how one defrauded person was forced to cash in his pension account and take out a 
second mortgage to satisfy a debt owed to his bank from the operation of a chargeback 
provision); Overby, supra note 15, at 383 (noting that elderly and infirm banking custom-
ers are prime victims for check fraud). 
149 Compare U.C.C. § 1-103(b) (providing a general back door for the admittance of 
common law claims), and Overby, supra note 15, at 391 (observing that “[a]rticles 3 and 4 
contain no express ‘displacement’ provision”), with U.C.C. § 4A-102 cmt. (providing that, 
unless explicitly incorporated, common law claims should not be allowed under Article 
4A). 
150 See U.C.C. § 3-406 (precluding individuals whose failure to exercise ordinary care 
substantially contributes to an alteration or forgery from asserting the fraud against a per-
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imposes losses on the drawer would be displaced by the statutory lan-
guage in section 3-406 because it 3-406 creates a preemption, rather 
than an independent cause of action.151 Nevertheless, section 3-406 
does not explicitly displace common law negligence actions.152 
 Without an explicit displacement provision, common law negli-
gence actions are often analyzed under the Code’s general preemption 
provision in section 1-103.153 Section 1-103(b) provides that “[u]nless 
displaced by the particular provisions of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, the principles of law and equity . . . supplement its provisions.”154 
The official comments caution that: 
The text of each section should be read in the light of the 
purposes and policy of the rule or principle in question, as 
also of the Uniform Commercial Code as a whole, and the 
application of the language should be construed narrowly or 
broadly . . . in conformity with the purposes and policies in-
volved.155 
Further, the official comments clarify that “while principles of common 
law and equity may supplement provisions of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, they may not be used to supplant its provisions, or the purposes 
and policies those provisions reflect.”156 As a general matter, then, the 
Code is intended to preempt any common law claim that is “inconsis-
tent with either its provisions or its purposes and policies.”157 
 The Code identifies its three main policy objectives in section 1-
103(a).158 First, the Code attempts to simplify, clarify and modernize 
                                                                                                                      
son who pays the instrument or takes it for value or collection in good faith to the extent 
that their negligence contributed to the losses, and establishing that the bank has the bur-
den of proving that the customer failed to exercise ordinary care); Robert A. Hillman et 
al., Common Law and Equity Under the Uniform Commercial Code 14-51 to -54 
(1985) [hereinafter Hillman 1985]; Robert A. Hillman et al., Common Law and Eq-
uity Under the Uniform Commercial Code: 1991 Cumulative Supplement S14-31 to -
32 (1991) [hereinafter Hillman 1991]. 
151 See U.C.C. § 3-406; Hillman 1985, supra note 150, at 14-51 to -54. 
152 See U.C.C. § 3-406; Hillman 1985, supra note 150, at 14-51 to -54. 
153 See U.C.C. § 1-103 (2002); cf. Overby, supra note 15, at 390–92 (describing how 
courts have struggled with section 1-103 analyses without meaningful guidance in Articles 
3 and 4). 
154 U.C.C. § 1-103(b). 
155 Id. § 1-103 cmt. 1. 
156 Id. § 1-103 cmt. 2. 
157 Id. 
158 See id. § 1-103(a). Article 1’s provisions apply to each of the other Code Articles. See 
id. § 1-102 (“This article applies to a transaction to the extent that it is governed by an-
other article of the Uniform Commercial Code.”). 
2226 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 54:2205 
the law governing commercial transactions.159 Second, the Code seeks 
to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through 
custom, usage, and agreement of the parties.160 Third, the Code aims 
to make the law uniform among the various jurisdictions in the areas it 
covers.161 To achieve these goals, the Code advocates for liberal con-
struction and application of its provisions wherever they apply.162 The 
official comments also note that the Code is “the primary source of 
commercial law rules in the areas that it governs, and its rules represent 
choices made by its drafters and the enacting legislatures about the ap-
propriate policies to be furthered in the transactions it covers.”163 
Other important policies specific to Articles 3 and 4 include promoting 
the transferability of instruments and the use of checks, placing the loss 
on the best risk bearer, and placing the loss on the party best able to 
have prevented the harm.164 
 Basing preemption analysis in policy is particularly difficult be-
cause check fraud scenarios often implicate competing policy objec-
tives.165 For example, disallowing common law negligence claims may 
promote uniformity of the law among jurisdictions by providing a reli-
able and predictable outcome for check fraud situations.166 But allow-
ing those common law claims supports the transferability of instru-
ments because the transferee is protected from bearing the ultimate 
loss if it can recover from the drawer.167 Allowing such claims also sup-
ports placing the loss with the negligent party, thereby encouraging 
drawers to be more vigilant in their efforts to deter fraud.168 
 Common law negligence claims brought by drawers against de-
positary banks highlight the problem with conflicting policies in the 
                                                                                                                      
159 See U.C.C. § 1-103(a) (2002). 
160 See id. 
161 See id. 
162 See id. 
163 Id. § 1-103 cmt. 2. 
164 See Hull, supra note 15, at 614. Under this rubric, the party best able to avoid the 
loss under the facts of the case may not always end up taking the loss under the Code’s 
allocation scheme. See id. Nor is the loss always placed on the best risk bearer, because the 
bank is often the best risk bearer, given its ability to spread losses through insurance and 
account fees. See id. See generally Robert D. Cooter & Edward L. Rubin, A Theory of Loss Allo-
cation for Consumer Payments, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 63 (1987) (arguing that applying economic 
analysis to loss allocation in payment systems leads to a set of rules consistent with both 
consumer protection and economic efficiency). 
165 See Hillman 1985, supra note 150, at 14-51 to -54; Hillman 1991, supra note 150, at 
S14-51. 
166 See U.C.C. § 1-103(a) (2002) (advocating for uniformity of law). 
167 See Hillman 1985, supra note 150, at 14-52. 
168 See id. 
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common law claim preemption analysis.169 For example, assume that 
Employee, who verifies and tracks check payment information for 
Business X, is forging Bookkeeper’s authorizing signature on fraudu-
lent checks in large amounts payable to Employee.170 Permitting Busi-
ness X to bring a negligence claim against Employee’s bank could un-
dermine the Code’s provisions by shifting the risk of loss for employee 
embezzlement from Business X onto the depositary bank and runs 
counter to the Code’s policy of promoting uniformity and predictability 
across jurisdictions.171 Section 3-405 would place the loss on Business X 
over Business X’s bank (the payor bank), suggesting that the Code in-
tends to leave the risk of loss in employee embezzlement situations on 
the employer.172 But section 3-405 only applies to the payor bank, and 
the Code recognizes that all banks have a duty to exercise ordinary care 
in section 4-103.173 Taken together, these provisions could suggest that 
the drawer’s common law negligence claim against the depositary bank 
might be allowed, even if the negligence claim against the payor bank is 
preempted.174 This result would support the Code’s policy of promot-
ing the transferability of instruments.175 
                                                                                                                      
169 See id. at 14-54. 
170 See generally U.C.C. § 3-405 (providing for employer’s liability for fraudulent in-
dorsement or signature by an employee). 
171 See id.; Hillman 1985, supra note 150, at 14-51. 
172 See U.C.C. § 3-405 (2002). 
173 See U.C.C. §§ 3-405, 4-103. Notably, the provisions of Article 4 are meant to super-
sede those in Article 3 wherever they conflict. See U.C.C. § 4-102(a). Although these provi-
sions do not directly conflict, there is some question whether the ordinary care provision 
imposes a duty of care on the payor bank in the employee embezzlement situation. See 
U.C.C. §§ 3-405, 4-102(a). For example, one official comment to Article 4 provides: 
 The rules of the section are applied only to collecting banks. Payor banks 
always have the problem of making proper payment of an item; whether such 
payment is proper should be based upon all of the rules of Articles 3 and 4 
and all of the facts of any particular case, and should not be dependent exclu-
sively upon instructions from or an agreement with a person presenting the 
item. 
Id. § 4-203 cmt. 
174 See U.C.C. § 1-103 (“Unless displaced by the particular provisions of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, the principles of law and equity . . . supplement its provisions.”); id. § 3-
405 (placing the risk of loss on employers in cases of employee embezzlement); id. § 4-103 
(requiring banks to exercise ordinary care); Hillman 1991, supra note 150, at S14-33. Of 
course, the depositary bank could take advantage of the holder in due course doctrine. See 
U.C.C. § 3-418; supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text (describing this defense and 
indicating that it is available even where a bank acts negligently). A holder in due course is 
someone who took an instrument in good faith and for value or who in good faith 
changed position in reliance on the payment or acceptance of it. U.C.C. § 3-418(c). 
175 See Hillman 1985, supra note 150, at 14-52. 
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B. Courts Interpret the Code in Different Ways 
 Absent clear guidance, courts have come to differing conclusions 
regarding the status of negligence claims under the Code.176 Courts 
generally agree that common law negligence claims are displaced 
where allowing them would thwart the purposes of the Code.177 But 
they articulate a variety of tests to determine whether a common law 
claim thwarts the purposes of the Code and often reach different re-
sults after applying them.178 Generally speaking, it appears that courts 
allow common law negligence claims when the particular facts of the 
case justify reaching beyond the Code to maintain simple fairness in 
the results, especially when the bank is engaged in poor business prac-
tices.179 This Section discusses these varying approaches and their re-
sults in check fraud cases since the 1990 amendments.180 
 The majority of courts use the comprehensive rights and remedies 
test to determine whether a common law claim has been displaced by 
the Code.181 The courts ask whether allowing the common law claims 
                                                                                                                      
 
176 Compare, e.g., Valley Bank, 147 P.3d at 192 (allowing a common law negligence claim by 
a customer against a bank), with C-Wood Lumber Co. v. Wayne Cty. Bank, 233 S.W.3d 263, 
281–82 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (rejecting a common law negligence claim by a customer 
against a bank). 
177 See, e.g., Cagle’s, Inc. v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 153 F. Supp. 2d 1288, 1298 (D. Ala. 2001); 
Sebastian v. D&S Express, Inc., 61 F. Supp. 2d 386, 391 (D.N.J. 1999). 
178 Compare, e.g., Valley Bank, 147 P.3d at 192 (allowing a common law negligence claim 
after analyzing the Code under a scope test), with C-Wood Lumber, 233 S.W.3d at 281–82 
(rejecting a common law negligence claim after analyzing the Code under a comprehen-
sive rights and remedies test). 
179 See, e.g., Lombino v. Bank of Am., 797 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1083–84 (D. Nev. 2011) (al-
lowing a negligence claim where a customer relied on bank employee’s representations of 
the check collection process); Old Republic Nat’l Title Ins. Co. v. Bank of E. Asia Ltd., 291 
F. Supp. 2d 60, 69 (D. Conn. 2003) (allowing a negligence claim where a bank opened an 
account based on power of attorney without meeting the actual client); Valley Bank, 147 
P.3d at 191–92 (same). 
180 See infra notes 181–220 and accompanying text. 
181 See, e.g., Adams v. Martinsville DuPont Credit Union, 573 F. Supp. 2d 103, 113 
(D.D.C. 2008) (“In instances where both [the Code and common law] provide a means of 
recovery, it has been generally held that the U.C.C. displaces the common law to ensure 
uniformity . . . .”); AmSouth Bank v. Tice, 923 So. 2d 1060, 1066 (Ala. 2005) (“[T]hose 
common-law claims are displaced or preempted if allowing the common-law claim would 
create ‘rights, duties, and liabilities inconsistent’ with those set forth in [the Code].”) (in-
ternal citation omitted; Advance Dental Care, Inc. v. SunTrust Bank, 816 F. Supp. 2d 268, 
270–71 (D. Md 2011) (“[C]ommon law negligence claims can proceed only in the absence 
of an adequate U.C.C. remedy . . . .”); Suffolk Credit Union v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, No. 
10-2763, 2011 WL 830262, at *5 (D.N.J. March 7, 2011) (“[P]arallel Code and common law 
claims may be maintained except in circumstances where (1) the Code provides a com-
prehensive remedial scheme and (2) reliance on the common law would undermine the 
purposes of the Code.”). Minnesota, Colorado, Tennessee, Georgia, and Ohio have also 
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would “create rights, duties, and liabilities inconsistent with those set 
forth in the [provisions of the UCC].”182 For instance, in 1999 in Sebas-
tian v. D&S Express, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey 
considered a common law negligence action based on the company’s 
former president making checks payable to fictitious payees and then 
cashing them with the same teller at the defendant bank over the 
course of four years.183 Although the plaintiff argued that the bank 
should have been aware of the fraud because of its duration and the 
fact that the same teller cashed the checks every time, the court held 
that the common law negligence claim was preempted because the 
UCC provision at issue, section 3-404, applied a standard very similar to 
the common law negligence standard.184 Section 3-404 essentially codi-
fies comparative negligence, because it provides that when a bank tak-
ing a check for value or collection fails to exercise ordinary care in pay-
ing or taking the check and the failure substantially contributes to the 
loss resulting from paying the check, the person bearing the loss may 
recover from the bank to the extent the failure to exercise ordinary 
care contributed to the loss.185 This duplication led the court to con-
clude that the Code covered the entire field of available legal theo-
ries.186 Thus, the common law claim was preempted because the Code 
provided a comprehensive remedy.187 
 Nevertheless, in applying the comprehensive rights and remedies 
test, at least one jurisdiction has recognized a carve-out for situations in 
which a special relationship existed between the parties.188 For exam-
                                                                                                                      
 
used this approach. See Promissor, Inc. v. Branch Bank & Trust Co., No. 108-CV-1704-BBM, 
2008 WL 5549451, at *2 (D. Ga. Oct. 31, 2008); Shelby Res., LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, 160 
P.3d 387, 391–92 (Colo. App. 2007); Bradley v. First Nat’l Bank of Webster, 711 N.W.2d 
121, 127 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006); Peters Family Farm v. The Sav. Bank, No. 10CA2, 2011 WL 
497476, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2011); C-Wood Lumber, 233 S.W.3d at 281–82. But see 
Metz v. Unizan Bank, 416 F. Supp. 2d 568, 581 (D. Ohio 2006) (applying a statutory inter-
pretation analysis); Notredan, LLC v. Old Republic Exch. Facilitator Co., 875 F. Supp. 2d 
780, 788 (W.D. Tenn. 2012) (applying a scope analysis); Chi. Title Ins. Co. v. Allfirst Bank, 
905 A.2d 366, 377 (Md. 2005) (same). 
182 See Braden Furniture Co., Inc. v. Union State Bank, 109 So. 3d 625, 630 (Ala. 2012); 
supra note 181 (collecting cases). 
183 See 61 F. Supp. 2d at 387. 
184 See id. at 391. 
185 See id.; U.C.C. § 3-404 (2002). 
186 See Sebastian, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 391. 
187 See id. 
188 See, e.g., In re Clear Advantage Title, 438 B.R. 58, 65 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2010) (“Courts 
have recognized tort liability of a financial institution where a special relationship has been 
established, such as fiduciary, confidential, contractual, or legal or where there was fraud or 
misrepresentation on the part of the defendant bank.”) (emphasis added); City Check 
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ple, in 2010, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey 
adopted this approach in In re Clear Advantage Title.189 A staff attorney 
and title examiner at Clear Advantage Title was creating payments for 
fictitious loans with the defendant bank, then indorsing checks on be-
half of the company and asking for treasurer’s checks in the same 
amount payable to personal creditors such as his children’s private 
school and a jeweler.190 Typically, the bank would not have been liable 
for the loss under the Code because the staff attorney was an employee 
with responsibility for checks.191 Importantly, though, the deposit 
agreement between Clear Advantage and the bank established that only 
account signers would be able to make withdrawals, including through 
checks, from the account.192 And though the staff attorney was not an 
account signer, the bank allowed him to obtain over $425,000 from the 
scheme.193 As a result, the court held that the deposit agreement re-
flected the type of contractual relationship that created a duty which 
existed independent of the Code and required the bank to inquire of 
the employee before allowing him to withdraw funds from the corpo-
rate account.194 
 Other courts use a scope test to determine whether the common 
law is preempted.195 This test asks whether the Code governs the fac-
tual circumstances underlying the dispute.196 The results depend on 
how broadly or narrowly the courts define the boundaries of the factual 
circumstances.197 For instance, in 2006, in Valley Bank of Ronan v. 
                                                                                                                      
Cashing v. Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co., 764 A.2d 411, 416–17 (N.J. 1999) (“Absent a special 
relationship, courts will typically bar claims of noncustomers against banks.”). 
189 See In re Clear Advantage Title, 438 B.R. at 65. 
190 See id. at 62. 
191 See id. at 65; U.C.C. § 3-405 (2011). 
192 See In re Clear Advantage Title, 438 B.R. at 62. 
193 See id. 
194 See id. at 65; see also City Check Cashing, 764 A.2d at 418 (noting that absent a “special 
relationship between the parties created by agreement, undertaking or contract, that gives 
rise to a duty, the sole remedies available are those provided in the Code”). 
195 See Notredan, 875 F. Supp. 2d at 788; Lombino, 797 F. Supp. 2d at 1083–84; Edward 
Orecchio, M.D., PLLC v. Conn. River Bank, No. 1:08-CV-164, 2009 WL 2160583, at *3 (D. 
Vt. July 14, 2009); Allfirst Bank, 905 A.2d at 377; Valley Bank, 147 P.3d at 191. 
196 See Valley Bank, 147 P.3d at 191 (“Because [the fact situation presented is] not ad-
dressed with specificity by the UCC, common law and equitable principles supplement the 
UCC and govern the legal rights and responsibilities that apply . . . .”). 
197 Compare, e.g., Lombino, 797 F. Supp. 2d at 1084 (allowing a negligence claim where 
the conduct underlying the claim was the defendant’s “duty to tell [the plaintiff] the 
truth” about the collections process because the fact pattern fell outside the scope of the 
Code), with Notredan, 875 F. Supp. 2d at 788 (rejecting a negligence claim where the bank 
honored a check payable to the plaintiff without its indorsement because the fact pattern 
fell within the scope of the Code). 
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Hughes, the Montana Supreme Court used a narrow interpretation of 
the facts to show that the claim arose outside the bounds of the 
Code.198 A customer brought a fraudulent bank check to his bank for 
deposit and inquired as to how long it would take for the funds to be 
collected.199 A bank officer replied that the bank check was the “same 
as cash” and he could therefore use the funds however he wished at any 
time.200 He initiated a payment out of the account using those funds, 
and the check was subsequently returned as fraudulent.201 The cus-
tomer brought a negligence claim against the bank based on the bank 
officer’s representations about the check.202 The court held that the 
negligence claim was not preempted by the Code, reasoning that the 
plaintiff’s claims encompassed both the check’s processing and the 
bank’s communication to him about that process.203 Because commu-
nications between the bank and its customer are not specifically ad-
dressed by the UCC, common law governed the legal rights and re-
sponsibilities that applied to the bank’s representations to the plaintiff, 
upon which he relied to his detriment.204 
 In contrast, in 2012 in Notredan, LLC v. Old Republic Exchange Facili-
tator Co., the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee 
used the scope test broadly to invalidate a common law negligence 
claim.205 There, the plaintiff had hired Old Republic to assist with a 
real estate transaction.206 Old Republic received a check payable to the 
plaintiff but not indorsed.207 Undaunted, the Old Republic employee 
deposited the check into a trust account, taking a portion of the money 
out as a fee.208 Notredan brought a negligence action against Old Re-
public’s bank for breaching its duty by allowing deposit of an unin-
dorsed item.209 The court held that the negligence claim was pre-
empted by the Code because it “embod[ies] a delicately balanced 
statutory scheme governing the endorsement, negotiation, collection, 
and payment of checks.”210 Because this dispute dealt with the in-
                                                                                                                      
198 See 147 P.3d at 191. 
199 See id. at 188–89. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. 
202 Id. at 191. 
203 See Valley Bank, 147 P.3d at 191. 
204 See id. 
205 See 875 F. Supp. 2d at 788. 
206 See id. at 783. 
207 See id. 
208 See id. 
209 See id. 
210 See id. at 788 (quoting C-Wood Lumber, 233 S.W.3d at 281). 
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dorsement and payment of checks, the Code provided all available loss 
allocation rules.211 
 Courts have also created conflicting case law based on the Code’s 
statutory language.212 Connecticut courts assume that if the state legis-
lature had intended for the Code to preempt common law claims, it 
would have made that explicit in the statutory language.213 In contrast, 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Ohio has held that common 
law claims were preempted because statutory provisions such as those 
in the Code should govern to the exclusion of prior, non-statutory law, 
unless there is a clear legislative intention that the statutory provisions 
are merely cumulative.214 
                                                                                                                      
 
211 See Notredan, 875 F. Supp. 2d at 788. 
212 Compare, e.g., Old Republic, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 69 (holding that a common law negli-
gence action was allowed under the Code because “[t]he Code provides that principles of 
law and equity shall supplement its provisions unless there is a particular provision of the 
Code that displaces the common law”), with Metz, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 581–82 (holding that 
a common law negligence action was not allowed under the Code because “Articles 3 and 
4 of the UCC establish the standard of care applicable to a bank's handling of a negotiable 
instrument, thus displacing common law negligence”). 
213 See, e.g., Old Republic, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 69 (observing that “[t]he Code provides 
that principles of law and equity shall supplement its provisions unless there is a particular 
provision of the Code that displaces the common law,” and remarking that “[t]he court 
has discovered no particular provision of the Code that would displace a remitter’s com-
mon law claim . . . of negligence against a depositary bank”); Van Der Werff v. Shawmut 
Bank Conn., No. CV 950554654, 1996 WL 686916, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 20, 1996) 
(“[I]n the absence of explicit statutory language . . . that [1-103] displaces common law 
claims for negligence, the Court concludes that the plaintiff is free to bring both a com-
mon law claim for negligence and a claim under [the Code].”); see also Lester Constr., LLC 
v. People’s United Bank, No. CV095024042S, 2009 WL 5698131, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
Dec. 18, 2009) (applying the same test as the Connecticut Superior Court in 1996 applied 
in Van Der Werff ); Roger Kaye, M.D., P.C. v. T.D. Banknorth, No. FSTCV085007268S, 2009 
WL 1532513, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 6, 2009) (holding that no specific provision pre-
empted the plaintiff from bringing a common law negligence claim); Leaksealers, Inc. v. 
Conn. Nat’l Bank, No. CV 92 0517952, 1995 WL 384611, at *4–5 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 
20, 1995) (noting that “the intent of the legislature is to be found . . . in what it did say,” 
that the Code “does not state that it precludes common law claims based on factual situa-
tions within it,” and that “[t]herefore, the plaintiff is not precluded from bringing a com-
mon law cause of action for negligence against the defendant” (internal citations omit-
ted)). It is worth noting that neither the Connecticut Supreme Court nor Appellate Court 
has appeared to have ruled on the role of section 1-103(b) on common law negligence in 
check fraud. See Roger Kaye, 2009 WL 1532513, at *2 (noting the absence of a definitive 
indication from the Connecticut Supreme Court or Appellate Court on the issue of com-
mon law claims in check fraud). 
214 See Metz, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 581. The Missouri Court of Appeals took a nuanced ap-
proach to statutory interpretation in the 1999 case Johnson Development Company v. First 
National Bank of St. Louis. See 999 S.W.2d 314, 318–19 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999). There, the in-
termediate appellate court held that common law negligence claims that arose during the 
Code’s one-year statute of limitations were permissible because they would not contradict 
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 In general, courts seem to allow common law negligence claims 
when the specific facts of the case and simple fairness justify placing li-
ability in a way that is inconsistent with the Code—particularly where 
banks engage in poor business practices.215 Common law negligence 
claims were allowed where the bank opened an account without meet-
ing the client or receiving proper documentation;216 where the bank 
allowed a non-signer to initiate transactions on accounts;217 where the 
bank failed to make an inquiry before depositing a check payable to the 
bank into a customer’s account;218 and where the bank’s employees 
made misstatements regarding the check collection process upon which 
the customers subsequently relied.219 Though courts arrive at these re-
sults using different preemption tests, results that appear anomalous 
upon initial consideration can be systematized using this rubric.220 
III. Yielding to the Code: Why the UCC Should Preempt Common 
Law Negligence Claims 
 This Part argues that a strict reading of the Code should require 
that common law negligence claims be preempted by the Code.221 
Given this reality, and because it preempts virtually all common law 
claims, the comprehensive rights and remedies test applied by the ma-
jority of courts is the best preemption test from a strictly legal stand-
                                                                                                                      
any of the Code’s “particular provisions.” See id. The negligence claims arising outside of 
the Code’s statute of limitations, however, were preempted by the statute of limitations 
provision. See id. 
215 See Lombino, 797 F. Supp. 2d at 1083–84 (allowing a negligence claim where the cus-
tomer relied on the bank employee’s representations of the check collection process); Old 
Republic, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 69 (allowing a negligence claim where the bank opened an 
account based on the power of attorney without meeting the client); Valley Bank, 147 P.3d 
at 191–92 (allowing a negligence claim where the customer relied on the bank employee’s 
representations of the check collection process). 
216 See Old Republic, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 69. 
217 See In re Clear Advantage Title, 438 B.R. at 65. 
218 See Allfirst Bank, 905 A.2d at 377. 
219 See Lombino, 797 F. Supp. 2d at 1084; Valley Bank, 147 P.3d at 191–92. Connecticut 
courts’ blanket acceptance of common law negligence actions in check fraud scenarios 
may also reflect a desire for fairness because it can be seen as an implicit statement of dis-
satisfaction with the loss allocation scheme provided by the Code. See, e.g., Lester Contr., 
2009 WL 5698131, at *6; Van Der Werff, 1996 WL 686916, at *3. 
220 See, e.g., Old Republic, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 69 (allowing a common law negligence 
claim because Articles 3 and 4 do not expressly prohibit them); In re Clear Advantage, 438 
B.R. at 65 (allowing a common law negligence claim under a special relationship excep-
tion to the comprehensive rights and remedies test); Valley Bank, 147 P.3d at 191 (allowing 
a common law negligence claim because the facts giving rise to the claim were deemed 
outside the scope of the Code). 
221 See infra notes 226–242 and accompanying text. 
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point.222 On the one hand, this is sensible because loss allocation rules 
protect the banking industry from additional liability due to federal 
regulation and allow banks to take advantage of cost-saving technol-
ogy.223 Nevertheless, the drafters should consider whether there are 
more equitable ways to allocate check fraud losses during the next revi-
sion cycle because many courts have had difficulty applying these 
rules.224 Until then, banking customers should consider pursuing elec-
tronic payment methods as an alternative to payment by check because 
electronic payments are safer, and the rules governing loss allocation 
for these payments are more equitable than those governing check 
fraud loss allocation.225 
A. Common Law Negligence Claims Generally Should Not Be Allowed  
Under a Fair Reading of the Code 
 In general, allowing common law negligence claims in check fraud 
cases arguably contradicts a fair reading of the Code.226 Allowing com-
mon law claims conflicts with section 1-103 because common law claims 
undermine the Code’s predictability and consistency.227 In fact, in revis-
ing section 1-103, the drafters specifically broadened its language to 
enhance its preemptive effect.228 They did not want courts to allow the 
Code’s purposes and policies to be frustrated by an unduly narrow 
reading of the preemption provision that asked only whether the text 
of the statutes specifically preempted or contradicted the Code’s 
scheme.229 Instead, they intended the Code to preempt the common 
law wherever a common law claim would conflict with the Code’s enu-
                                                                                                                      
222 See infra notes 243–246 and accompanying text. 
223 See infra notes 247–259 and accompanying text. 
224 See infra notes 260–276 and accompanying text. 
225 See infra notes 277–288 and accompanying text. 
226 See U.C.C. § 1-103(b) cmt. 2 (2002) (“[The preemptive power of the Code] extends 
to displacement of other law that is inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, as well as with its text.”); infra notes 227–233 (illustrating how 
common law negligence claims are inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the 
Code). 
227 See U.C.C. § 1-103(b) (“[The Uniform Commercial Code] must be liberally con-
strued and applied to . . . simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing commercial 
transactions [and] . . . to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.”); see also 
Patco Constr. Co. v. People’s United Bank, 684 F.3d 197, 216 (1st Cir. 2012) (suggesting 
that common law negligence claims are uniformly considered preempted in the context of 
electronic payment fraud scenarios under Article 4A). 
228 See U.C.C. § 1-103 cmt. 2 (describing that the intended effect of revised section 1-
103 is to clarify the broad preemption power of the Code). 
229 See id.; see also Patco, 684 F.3d at 216 (disallowing a common law negligence claim 
because it was inconsistent with the duties and liabilities set forth in Article 4A). 
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merated purposes and policies.230 Allowing common law negligence 
claims in check fraud cases undermines the Code’s goal of creating 
predictable outcomes by opening the door to highly variable tort dam-
ages.231 At the same time, the benefits of enhancing the negotiability of 
instruments by allowing common law negligence claims are less obvi-
ous.232 On balance, then, the Code’s overarching policies of predict-
ability, consistency, and comprehensive coverage of commercial dis-
putes are better served by a broad reading of the Code’s applicability.233 
 Nevertheless, the case law highlights some of the imperfections 
with the loss allocation scheme of Articles 3 and 4.234 The view of the 
negligence remedy as a safety valve for unfair results may explain why 
Articles 3 and 4 do not include a provision specifically precluding 
common law negligence claims even after two revisions.235 The drafting 
committee may have seen the value in maintaining common law negli-
gence claims as a release for situations when fairness considerations 
dictate a result other than that which would be achieved by a strict and 
exclusive application of the Code’s loss allocation scheme.236 Of course, 
                                                                                                                      
 
230 See U.C.C. § 1-103 cmt. 2. 
231 See id. § 1-103(b) (goals of the Code); id. § 1-103 cmt. 2 (providing that principles 
of common law may not supplant the goals of the Code); Hillman 1985, supra note 150, at 
14-51; see also Valley Bank of Ronan v. Hughes, 147 P.3d 185, 188–89 (Mont. 2006) (illus-
trating that whereas the bank was potentially liable for a large sum of money pursuant to a 
common law negligence action, the bank would not be liable pursuant to the Code’s right 
of chargeback). 
232 See U.C.C. § 1-103(b) (goals of the Code); id. § 1-103 cmt. 2 (providing that princi-
ples of common law may not supplant the goals of the Code); Hillman 1985, supra note 
150, at 14-51; see also Valley Bank of Ronan v. Hughes, 147 P.3d 185, 188–89 (Mont. 2006) 
(noting that, although the bank faced potential liability under a common law negligence 
claim, the bank had a clear right under the Code to charge back the customer’s account). 
233 See U.C.C. § 1-103 (2002) (articulating the policies promoted by the Code); Hill-
man 1985, supra note 150, at 14-51. 
234 See, e.g., Old Republic Nat’l Title Ins. Co. v. Bank of E. Asia, Ltd., 291 F. Supp. 2d 60, 
69 (D. Conn. 2003) (observing that Articles 3 and 4 do not expressly prohibit common law 
claims); In re Clear Advantage Title, 438 B.R. 58, 65 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2010) (allowing a com-
mon law negligence claim where the plaintiff and defendant bank had established a spe-
cial relationship that imposed additional duties on the bank, which existed independently 
of Articles 3 and 4); Valley Bank, 147 P.3d at 191 (allowing a common law negligence claim 
because the loss allocation scheme in Articles 3 and 4 did not contemplate the facts at 
issue in the case). 
235 See generally U.C.C. arts. 3 & 4. See Overby, supra note 15, at 351 n.3. The 2002 
amendments did not address the loss allocation provisions. See id. 
236 See Overby, supra note 15, at 351 n.3 (suggesting the 2002 revision committee did 
not take up check fraud rules because they are contentious); cf. Lombino v. Bank of Am., 
797 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1084 (D. Nev. 2011) (allowing a negligence claim where the cus-
tomer relied on a bank employee’s representations of the check collection process); Old 
Republic, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 69 (allowing a negligence claim where the bank opened an 
account based on the power of attorney without meeting the actual client); In re Clear Ad-
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the absence of a preemption provision may have been nothing more 
than a happy accident.237 
 Article 4A, dealing with electronic payments, also supports a strict 
preemption reading.238 Article 4A explains that, although competing 
interests are commonplace within funds transfer scenarios, those com-
peting interests were necessarily considered and balanced during the 
drafting process.239 As such, the resulting rules reflect a balance of 
those interests and are “intended to be the exclusive means of deter-
mining the rights, duties and liabilities of the affected parties in any 
situation covered by . . . [Article 4A].”240 For this reason, resorting to 
common law claims is generally not appropriate in cases involving elec-
tronic funds transfers.241 If the Code generally rejects common law 
claims for electronic payments, an extension of this policy to payments 
made by check is highly reasonable.242 
 Through this lens, the comprehensive rights and remedies test is 
the best preemption test for courts to use to determine whether com-
                                                                                                                      
vantage, 438 B.R. at 65 (allowing a negligence claim where bank permitted a non-account 
signer to conduct transactions from an account in violation of the deposit account agree-
ment); Valley Bank, 147 P.3d at 191–92 (allowing a negligence claim where the customer 
relied on a bank employee’s representations of the check collection process). 
237 Cf. Memorandum from Fred H. Miller, Chair, Study Comm. on Payments Issues, & 
Linda J. Rusch, Reporter, Request for Comments on Issues Under U.C.C. Articles 3 and 4, at 
3 (Mar. 16, 2009), available at http://www.law.gonzaga.edu/files/Payments-WhitePaper.pdf. 
(soliciting comments regarding the availability of common law contract and negligence ac-
tions under Articles 3 and 4 for the Study Committee on Payment Issues, sponsored by the 
Uniform Law Commission and American Law Institute). The fact that the revision commit-
tee solicited comments regarding whether Articles 3 and 4 allow common law negligence 
claims perhaps suggests that the drafting committee had no opinion on the matter. Cf. id. 
238 See U.C.C. § 4A-102 cmt. According to one official comment of an Article 4A provi-
sion: 
 Funds transfers involve competing interests . . . . [which] were represented 
in the drafting process and . . . . [were] thoroughly considered. The rules that 
emerged represent a careful and delicate balancing of those interests and are 
intended to be the exclusive means of determining the rights, duties and li-
abilities of the affected parties in any situation covered by particular provi-
sions of this Article. Consequently, resort to principles of law or equity outside 
of Article 4A is not appropriate to create rights, duties and liabilities inconsis-
tent with those stated in this Article. 
Id. 
239 See U.C.C. § 4A-102 cmt. (2002). 
240 See id. 
241 See id.; see also Patco, 684 F.3d at 216 (disallowing a common law negligence claim 
because it was inconsistent with the duties and liabilities set forth in Article 4A). 
242 Cf. U.C.C. § 4A-102 cmt. 1 (“[R]esort to principles of law and equity outside of Arti-
cle 4A is not appropriate to create rights, duties, and liabilities inconsistent with those 
stated in this Article.”). 
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mon law negligence claims should be allowed in check fraud scenar-
ios.243 It reads the Code’s applicability broadly and preempts virtually 
all common law negligence claims, consistent with the policy impera-
tives and official comments in section 1-103 and Article 4A’s ap-
proach.244 At the same time, it preserves an opening for common law 
claims in the rare instance where the public policy of incentivizing 
good business practices outweighs the Code’s policy goals.245 And be-
cause these cases are so rare, allowing common law negligence claims 
in these limited instances has very little negative impact on predictabil-
ity or parties’ rights because these decisions are strongly tied to the spe-
cific set of factual circumstances presented in each case.246 
B. The Loss Allocation Scheme Provides Latent Benefits 
 It is unlikely that the loss allocation rules as presently constituted 
are driven by a desire to protect the banking lobby at the expense of its 
customers.247 As prominent Code scholar Grant Gilmore satirically 
noted, “[l]uncheon at the Bankers’ Club is not given over to devising 
ways and means of hoisting the poor customer each day a little higher 
                                                                                                                      
243 Compare id. § 1-103(b) (illustrating the policy goals of the Code, including consis-
tency and predictability), and supra notes 226–233 and accompanying text (suggesting that 
because common law claims inject a measure of unpredictability, the goals of the Code are 
better preserved by considering these claims preempted), with Bradley v. First Nat’l Bank 
of Walker, 711 N.W.2d 121, 127 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (illustrating how the comprehensive 
rights and remedies test is particularly predisposed to conclusions of common law claim 
preemption, where the court placed the risk of loss on the customer even where the bank 
allowed a non-signer to initiate transactions from the customer’s account). 
244 See AmSouth Bank v. Tice, 923 So. 2d 1060, 1066 (Ala. 2005) (illustrating how the 
comprehensive rights and remedies test operates to preempt common law claims); Bradley, 
711 N.W.2d at 127 (same); U.C.C. § 1-103(b) (indicating that predictability is an important 
goal of the Code); id. § 1-103 cmt. 2 (remarking that the Code’s “rules represent choices 
made by its drafters and the enacting legislatures about the appropriate policies to be fur-
thered in the transactions it covers”); id. § 4A-102 cmt. (remarking that the rules of Article 
4A were “intended to be the exclusive means of determining the rights, duties and liabili-
ties of the affected parties in any situation covered by” that Article). 
245 See, e.g., Lombino, 797 F. Supp. 2d at 1084 (allowing a negligence claim where a cus-
tomer relied on the bank employee’s representations of the check collection process); Old 
Republic, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 69 (allowing a negligence claim where the bank opened an 
account based on the power of attorney without meeting the client); Valley Bank, 147 P.3d 
at 191–92 (allowing a negligence claim where a customer relied on the bank employee’s 
representations of the check collection process). 
246 See supra note 245 (collecting cases). 
247 See Grant Gilmore, The Uniform Commercial Code: A Reply to Professor Beutel, 61 Yale L. 
J. 364, 376 (1952). But see Overby, supra note 15, at 353 (citing Zekan, supra note 129, at 
166–76) (describing the banks as “winners” in a “winner takes all approach” to loss alloca-
tion under Articles 3 and 4). 
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on his own petard.”248 Rather, the loss allocation scheme reflects the 
practical difficulties of banks in maintaining the paper check payment 
system on which their customers rely.249 
 The bank’s absolute right of chargeback protects banks from liabil-
ity that would otherwise result from the intersection of check float and 
expedited funds availability.250 Prior to the Expedited Funds Availability 
Act and Regulation CC, banks would place a hold on a customer’s ac-
count for the amount of a deposited check until the funds affirmatively 
came in.251 Now, banks must make funds from check deposits available 
long before the money has actually arrived at the depositary bank.252 
Where expedited funds availability in Regulation CC removed the 
bank’s self-protection method of placing funds on hold until they were 
collected, the absolute right of chargeback now protects banks from 
the dangers inherent to check float.253 And so long as the customer is 
responsible about taking checks from reliable sources and maintaining 
sufficient funds in the account to cover a chargeback until a check 
clears, the provision will almost never become a problem for the cus-
tomer.254 
 The Code’s revisions to the standard of ordinary care also reflect a 
realistic balance between the bank’s interests in economic efficiency 
and the customer’s interest in maintaining a check-based payment sys-
tem.255 Checks are the most expensive form of payment from a process-
ing standpoint, but the country’s continued reliance on the paper 
                                                                                                                      
248 Gilmore, supra note 247, at 376. 
249 Compare McAndrews & Roberds, supra note 51, at 18–22 (suggesting that the United 
States is tied to the check payment system), with Regulation CC, 12 C.F.R. § 229.12 (2013) 
(providing for expedited funds availability), and U.C.C. § 4-214 (2002) (providing banks 
with the right of chargeback). 
250 See 12 C.F.R. § 229.12; U.C.C. § 4-214. 
251 See Mucklestone, supra note 42, at 39–41. 
252 See id. at 41–42. 
253 See 12 C.F.R. § 229.12; U.C.C. § 4-214. 
254 See McAndrews & Roberds, supra note 51, at 18–20. This is true unless he or she re-
lies on the bank’s erroneous representations about the collection process, in which case 
the bank would be liable under a common law negligence theory. See Valley Bank, 147 P.3d 
at 191–92. 
255 Compare Bauer & Gerdes, supra note 35, at 1–3 & fig.2 (illustrating the economic ef-
ficiency created by electronic presentment), with U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(9) (2002) (describing 
that with regard to “ordinary care,” that “reasonable commercial standards do not require 
the bank to examine the instrument if the failure to examine does not violate the bank’s 
prescribed procedures and the bank’s procedures do not vary unreasonably from general 
banking usage not disapproved by this Article or Article 4”), and id. § 3-103. at cmt. 4 (not-
ing that a portion of the ordinary care definition is “limited to the duty of a bank to exam-
ine an instrument taken by a bank for processing for collection or payment by automated 
means,” such as electronic presentment). 
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check payment system renders a strong push toward electronic pay-
ments unreasonable, even though such a move could save the banking 
industry billions of dollars.256 For example, the Check 21 Act, which 
provides for federal approval of electronic presentment, has resulted in 
significant savings and reduced the processing cost per check to less 
than one third of its pre-electronic presentment cost.257 The drafters 
likely removed the court-created sight review requirement from the 
standard of ordinary care so that the banks would not incur liability as a 
result of making the economically rational choice to convert to elec-
tronic presentment, especially after the passage of the Check 21 Act.258 
This result is consistent with good policy because it reduces the costs 
that are ultimately passed on to bank customers and reflects the Code’s 
desire to grow and change in response to new commercial and techno-
logical developments.259 
 Although preemption should be the general rule for common law 
negligence claims in check fraud cases, the drafters should consider 
whether there are more equitable ways to allocate check fraud losses 
during the next revision cycle because the rules as presently constituted 
are unclear and contentious.260 As an initial matter, the drafters should 
include an explicit statement either precluding common law negli-
gence actions in check fraud scenarios, or declaring the circumstances 
under which a common law negligence action is available under Arti-
cles 3 and 4.261 This would end the uncertainty inherent in a policy-
based analysis under section 1-103(b).262 
                                                                                                                      
 
256 See Bauer & Gerdes, supra note 35, at 3 fig.2; McAndrews & Roberds, supra note 51 
at 17–18. The United States maintained its reliance on paper-based checks even as elec-
tronic payments became increasingly available and other developed countries moved to-
ward electronic forms of payment. See McAndrews & Roberds, supra note 51, at 17. In the 
United States, 75% of noncash payments in 1997 were made via check, compared with 
36% in Canada and 31% in the United Kingdom for the same year. See id. 
257 See Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act (Check 21 Act), Pub. L. No. 108-100, 
§ 4(b), 117 Stat. 1177, 1180 (2003) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5003(b) (2012)); 
Bauer & Gerdes, supra note 35, at 1–3 & fig.2. 
258 See supra note 255 and accompanying text (illustrating how electronic presentment 
is advantageous for its economic efficiency and how the Code has reduced the duties of 
banks in this context). 
259 See U.C.C. § 1-103 cmt. 1 (“The Uniform Commercial Code is drawn to provide 
flexibility so that . . . it will provide its own machinery for expansion of commercial prac-
tices.”); Bauer & Gerdes, supra note 35, at 3 fig.2; Mucklestone, supra note 42, at 39. 
260 See Hillebrand, supra note 129, at 697–98; Overby, supra note 15, at 353 (citing 
Zekan, supra note 129, at 166–76). 
261 See supra notes 145–220 (illustrating how uncertainty has prompted a variety of dif-
ferent tests among courts, which has led to differing results); cf. U.C.C. § 3-420 (2002) 
(defining availability of conversion claims for instruments); id. § 4A-102 cmt. (2002) (pro-
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 In addition, the drafters should consider providing a separate set 
of rules for businesses than for individual consumers.263 The Code and 
other laws already provide separate rules for consumers and businesses 
in other contexts.264 The current loss allocation structure works well in 
the business context because it best reflects the policy of placing the 
risk of loss on the best risk avoider, especially because a significant pro-
portion of check fraud scenarios in the business context are perpe-
trated by employees.265 Employee embezzlement is easier for the em-
ployer to prevent through oversight and other internal controls than 
for the bank to prevent through the check clearing system, and the 
current loss allocation scheme is well-suited to address these types of 
situations by assigning the risk of loss on the employer.266 
 For individual consumers, however, the Code should place the risk 
of loss on the bank, subject only to the current comparative negligence 
rule.267 Under this paradigm, the Code would still allow a customer’s 
failure to review bank statements to be a factor in the negligence analy-
sis.268 This resulting system would best reflect the overarching policy of 
consumer protection evidenced by other areas of payment law, while 
still holding the customer accountable for avoidable losses.269 
                                                                                                                      
 
hibiting resort to common law in electronic payment situations unless Article 4A expressly 
incorporated the common law in a particular context). 
262 See Hillman 1985, supra note 150, at 14-51 to -52 (discussing the competing poli-
cies involved in transactions covered by Articles 3 and 4). 
263 See infra notes 264–269 and accompanying text (supporting this proposition). 
264 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 522 (2012) (providing different exemption rules for individuals 
and other entities); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693, 1666 (2012) (providing consumer-protective rules 
for debit and credit card fraud); U.C.C. § 2-314 (providing an implied warranty of mer-
chantability to a buyer of goods of the kind for which the seller is a merchant); id. § 9-
320(b) (allowing a consumer-purchaser to avoid a creditor’s security interest where the 
creditor failed to file on the good purchased from the consumer-debtor). 
265 See Overby, supra note 15, at 372. 
266 See U.C.C. § 3-405(b) (imposing the risk of loss on an employer for the actions of 
an employee entrusted with certain responsibilities); Overby, supra note 15, at 375; see also 
Cagle’s, Inc. v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 153 F. Supp. 2d 1288, 1298 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (holding a 
company liable for losses incurred when accounts payable employee wrote large checks 
from the company account payable to herself and deposited them in her personal bank 
account); C-Wood Lumber Co. v. Wayne Cty. Bank, 233 S.W.3d 263, 281–82 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. 2007) (holding a lumber mill liable for losses where employee-treasurer embezzled 
funds). 
267 See infra notes 268–269 and accompanying text (supporting this proposition); see 
also U.C.C. § 3-406 (2002) (imposing a comparative negligence burden on consumers). 
268 See Overby, supra note 15, at 373. 
269 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 522 (providing broader exemption rules for individuals than 
for other entities in the bankruptcy context); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693, 1666 (providing con-
sumer-protective rules for debit and credit card fraud); cf. Adams v. Martinsville DuPont 
Credit Union, 573 F. Supp. 103, 113 (D.D.C. 2008) (holding the consumer accountable as 
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 For both business and consumer customers, the Code should pro-
vide a new provision assigning the risk of loss to the bank wherever cus-
tomers rely on representations by bank employees about the check 
clearing process and that reliance leads to customer losses.270 Absent 
such an inquiry into funds availability, a customer should bear the risk 
of loss for sending out funds during the float period because float is 
such a well-known phenomenon and so many customers take advan-
tage of it.271 But a customer who relies on a bank for information re-
garding the check clearing process before initiating a payment based 
on deposited funds acts both reasonably and responsibly.272 Further-
more, Nigerian check fraud schemes are so well-documented that a 
customer’s question about funds availability in connection with an out-
going wire or other payment should cause alarms to sound in any bank 
employee’s mind.273 Simply put, banks should be held accountable for 
information provided to customers about the bank’s own services.274 
Whereas businesses are in the best position to prevent employee fraud 
through oversight, banks are in the best position to prevent fraud that 
takes advantage of check float when a customer inquires about funds 
availability, because the bank knows the check clearing process and 
                                                                                                                      
a result of an avoidable loss—namely one resulting from the theft of the consumer’s 
checks from his vehicle, which the consumer allowed to clear); Van Der Werff v. Shawmut 
Bank Conn., No. CV 950554654, 1996 WL 686916, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 20, 1996) 
(protecting the consumer by allowing a common law negligence claim where the con-
sumer acted responsibly to avoid the loss by promptly notifying the bank after her check-
book was stolen). 
270 See Lombino, 797 F. Supp. 2d at 1083–84 (allowing a negligence claim where the cus-
tomer relied on a bank employee’s representations of the check collection process); Old 
Republic, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 69 (allowing a negligence claim where the bank opened an 
account based on the power of attorney without meeting actual client); Valley Bank, 147 
P.3d at 191–92 ( allowing a negligence claim where the customer relied on a bank em-
ployee’s representations of the check collection process ); cf. Adams, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 113 
(rejecting negligence claim despite consultation with the bank manager). 
271 See McAndrews & Roberds, supra note 51, at 18–22 (“[F]loat continues to offer a 
key motive for the continued use of checks.”). 
272 See, e.g., Lombino, 797 F. Supp. 2d at 1083–84 (protecting the customer by allowing a 
common law negligence claim when the bank customer inquired about the check clearing 
process prior to initiating the outgoing wire transfer); Valley Bank, 147 P.3d at 191–92 
(same); cf. Adams, 573 F. Supp. at 113 (rejecting a negligence claim despite consultation 
with the bank manager). 
273 See, e.g., Valley Bank, 147 P.3d at 191–92 (illustrating a typical Nigerian check fraud 
scheme); Staying Safe from “Nigerian” Scams, Ada County Sheriff’s Off., http://www.ada 
sheriff.org/StayingSafe/NigerianScams.aspx (last visited Oct. 10, 2013); Common Fraud 
Schemes, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/scams-safety/fraud (last visited Oct. 10, 2013). 
274 See Lombino, 797 F. Supp. 2d at 1083–84; Valley Bank, 147 P.3d at 191–92. 
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likely has substantial knowledge about typical fraud schemes.275 Simple 
fairness requires that this loophole be closed.276 
 Until Articles 3 and 4 are revised, though, the loss allocation 
scheme may be beneficial because it incentivizes bank customers to 
move away from payment by check.277 Whereas bank accounts may not 
be optional in today’s society, payment by check is optional.278 Pay-
ments by wire transfer, ACH, or credit or debit cards benefit banks and 
their customers because they are easy and cost-efficient.279 The banking 
customer can easily pay with these methods at a point of sale, from his 
or her home or office computer, or even from a mobile phone.280 
Banks benefit because electronic transactions are far less expensive: a 
debit card transaction, for instance, costs thirty-five cents less to process 
than a check for the same amount.281 Converting just one out of every 
four check transactions into a debit card transaction in 2010 would 
have yielded over $700 million in savings.282 Furthermore, fraud com-
mitted by these payment methods fall under the more equitable rules 
in Regulation CC and Article 4A, providing benefits to both consumer 
and business banking customers.283 And because Article 4A’s preemp-
tion language renders common law claims largely unavailable, both 
banks and customers can rely on the predictability of the rules.284 
 Finally, whereas technological advances are making check fraud 
easier to commit and harder to detect, they are making electronic 
payments safer and also making fraud easier to catch.285 Standard secu-
rity procedures incorporate a constantly evolving variety of knowledge 
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and physically based security features to verify transactions.286 And be-
cause a banking customer can access account activity statements from 
any computer or mobile phone, fraud is far less likely to go unnoticed 
with reasonable diligence by the account holder, especially because us-
ers access transaction information through the same portal they use for 
payment processing services.287 Also, removing the physical check from 
circulation means that there is no way to fraudulently indorse a third 
party’s payment or for an employee to alter the amount of a paycheck 
or expense reimbursement.288 
Conclusion 
 Technology has changed the payment landscape over the last sev-
eral decades, both for paper-based check payments and electronic 
funds transfers. A strict reading of the Code arguably requires that 
common law negligence claims in check fraud scenarios be preempted 
by the Code, making the comprehensive rights and remedies test the 
most accurate reflection of the Code’s purposes and policies. At the 
same time, other tests and the inconsistent results of their applications 
suggest that the loss allocation rules are perceived as one-sided and that 
the drafters should consider whether there are more equitable ways to 
allocate check fraud losses during the next revision cycle. Nevertheless, 
the allocation provisions provide important protections for banks that 
make maintenance of the check payment systems possible. Until such 
revisions are made, banking customers should consider moving to elec-
tronic payments because they are safer, and the rules governing loss 
allocation for electronic payments are more equitable than those for 
check fraud loss allocation. 
Melissa Waite 
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